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Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable 
Role of Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement 
Doctrine 
Mark Bartholomew 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Online technologies have created a new litigation locus for the 
owners of copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Once content to 
prosecute only actual infringers, intellectual property rights holders 
now focus their attention on intermediaries that provide the means 
for massive simultaneous infringement by thousands of separate 
Internet users.1 Like an elite police force that has elected to target 
kingpins and ignore petty criminals, rights holders have begun to 
eschew the direct infringers, instead setting their sights on bigger 
game.2 
This unprecedented litigation strategy has put sudden pressure 
on courts to evaluate the liability of indirect infringers. But the 
current state of contributory infringement doctrine offers inadequate 
guidance, resulting in inconsistent adjudications. The recent 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, The State University 
of New York. The author would like to thank Cathleen Kaveney, Salil Mehra, and Eugene 
Volokh as well as the participants in the Eighth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars 
Conference at Stanford Law School and the 2008-2009 Faculty Workshop Series at the 
University at Buffalo Law School for their helpful suggestions. Lindsay Bernstein and Doug 
Smith provided valuable research assistance. 
 1. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1353–54 (2004) (referring to new 
strategy of copyright holders to enforce their rights against indirect infringers as a “seismic 
shift” in copyright enforcement); see also 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:55 
(2008) (describing sharp upturn in contributory infringement cases matching the increasing 
popularity of the World Wide Web); Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the 
Internet and on Modern Computer Systems—Who is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303, 304–33 (1998) (describing potential for “mass patent 
infringement over the Internet” and concomitant pressure on secondary liability doctrine). 
 2. The Recording Industry Association of America recently announced that it would 
discontinue lawsuits against individuals for illegally downloading music files, instead focusing 
its efforts on pressuring internet service providers to take the initiative to prevent inappropriate 
use of file sharing technology. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Recording Industry to Discontinue 
Litigation Program, Cites Changing Marketplace, 77 U.S. L. WK. 2392 (2009).  
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jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit provides a perfect example. In less 
than two months the court flip-flopped, finding that the 
contributory liability standard was satisfied in the case of a search 
engine that led Internet users to infringing websites but not in the 
case of credit card companies that processed the payments that made 
the same infringing websites financially viable.3 The court offered 
little to explain the difference in the two outcomes, simply stating 
that “location services” were somehow different than “payment 
services.”4 
Without a developed body of intellectual property case law on 
which to base their opinions, federal courts have resorted to 
importing secondary liability principles from other bodies of law to 
justify their decisions. In shaping the modern rules of contributory 
infringement, judges are relying on indirect liability doctrines from 
common law tort and criminal law. The Supreme Court has 
instructed the lower courts to mine tort law precedent to solve 
contributory infringement questions.5 Meanwhile, in the context of 
an increasing criminalization of intellectual property law, analogies to 
criminal prosecution of accomplices have taken root in contributory 
infringement jurisprudence. For example, in the case of the credit 
card companies mentioned above, Ninth Circuit judge Alex Kozinski 
posited that the companies’ provision of financial services for 
infringing websites was akin to the help provided by the person who 
drives the getaway car from an armed robbery or fronts the cash 
necessary to purchase narcotics.6 For Kozinksi, criminal common law 
provides a suitable source of content for civil infringement law. 
These doctrinal moves elicit little controversy. If anything, courts 
only face criticism from the legal academy when they supposedly 
stray too far from common law principles in deciding infringement 
cases.7 
 
 3. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 4. Visa, 494 F.3d at 797 n.8. Six months later, the Ninth Circuit amended its opinion 
in Amazon.com, but did not alter its analysis of contributory liability. Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 5. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–36 (2005); see also 
BUC Int’l. Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.19 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 6. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815. 
 7. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941, 
1022 (2007) (faulting the Sony decision for failing to apply tort principles of secondary 
liability); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright 
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There is often a mismatch, however, between the guiding 
justifications for criminal law and tort law and the very different 
rationales for intellectual property protection. In short, the 
contributory liability doctrine for the former bodies of law is a poor 
fit for the latter. In a companion article, I contend that much more 
analysis needs to be done before judges assessing contributory 
infringement liability can learn anything useful from tort law’s 
contributory liability doctrine.8 In this Article, I maintain that it does 
not make sense for contributory infringement law to depend on the 
same principles that determine the culpability of criminal 
accomplices. Contributory infringement law and its criminal law 
counterpart, known as “accomplice liability,” have evolved in 
different directions because they are animated by different principles. 
Infringement law’s explicitly nonretributive justification clashes with 
the moral basis for criminal punishment of aiders and abettors of 
crimes. 
Nevertheless, a study of criminal contributory liability offers 
insights into the current functioning and normative goals of 
contributory infringement law.9 One way to find out more about the 
nature of something is to juxtapose it against a related entity.10 Even 
though contributory infringement doctrine should not be altered to 
resemble its criminal law counterpart, scrutiny of accomplice liability 
suggests some new ways of thinking about the liability of indirect 
infringers. Close comparison of the secondary liability regimes of 
criminal law and intellectual property law provides an explanation of 
where contributory infringement law is and where it should go. 
Part II of this Article introduces the doctrine of contributory 
liability in intellectual property and details the controversies in this 
 
Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 
149 (2007) (“[T]he tort principles that have guided copyright law since its inception should 
continue to guide copyright’s further evolution.”); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the 
Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 852 (2005) (“[C]ourts have borrowed 
too little from tort law in the existing construction of third party copyright liability.”); Jason 
Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standard for Contributory Trademark Liability Over the Internet, 
39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 411 (2006) (calling for “preserving traditional 
standards” of contributory liability in dealing with the new context of trademark infringement 
via the Internet). 
 8.  Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement (forthcoming 
2010). 
 9. Cf. Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 
753, 755 (1943). 
 10.  Id. 
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area of jurisprudence. A contributory infringer must be shown to 
have “knowledge” of infringement and to “materially contribute” to 
the infringement. The content of these two requirements is open to 
question, particularly in the area of material contribution.  
Part III examines the doctrine of accomplice liability. For 
conviction of an accomplice, the prosecution must demonstrate that 
the accomplice intended for the criminal action to occur. The 
accomplice must also perform some sort of act in an effort to further 
the crime, but may be liable even if the act was minimal and had no 
effect on the crime or its perpetrator. Because accomplice liability 
differs greatly from current application of intellectual property 
contributory liability doctrine, the contours of intellectual property 
law would be dramatically altered if the courts accepted analogies 
like Judge Kozinski’s.  
Part IV maintains that remaking indirect infringement law in 
criminal law’s image would be unwise. The analogy between 
accomplice liability and contributory infringement fails given careful 
consideration of the reasons behind imposing criminal sanctions on 
indirect actors. Accountability for accomplices requires a tight nexus 
between the mental state of the defendant and the ultimate criminal 
act committed by another. This paradigm cannot be used, however, 
to structure contributory infringement law given the different 
theoretical bases for the two secondary liability regimes and the 
particular evidentiary issues accompanying infringement.  
Instead, another organizing principle for contributory 
infringement, outside of criminal law, must be found. In Part V, I 
suggest that causal principles can be used to provide much needed 
content for contributory infringement doctrine. Causation inherently 
appeals to our own sense of responsibility. Although causation has 
little impact on accomplice liability decisions, its familiarity to the 
legal community in other contexts makes it an attractive source of 
legal rules. Part V begins to sketch out what a doctrine of causation 
for contributory infringement should look like.  
II. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY RULES IN COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, 
AND PATENT LAW 
All three of the main intellectual property regimes, which include 
copyright, trademark, and patent law, recognize some form of 
secondary liability—the idea that one party may be held liable for 
infringement even if it did not itself directly infringe on the 
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intellectual property right at issue. Secondary liability can be broken 
down into two distinct subcategories: contributory liability and 
vicarious liability. Often a claim for contributory infringement is 
coupled with a separate claim for vicarious liability. Nevertheless, the 
two doctrines are different. Contributory liability and vicarious 
liability have separate historical origins and theoretical justifications.11 
The main difference between the two subcategories is that vicarious 
liability is based exclusively on the relationship between the 
defendant and the direct infringer, while contributory liability is 
based on the actions of the defendant as well as the defendant’s state 
of mind in relation to the underlying infringement.12 A party can be 
held vicariously liable without any knowledge or participation in the 
infringement.13 An in-depth discussion of vicarious liability for 
infringement and a comparison of that doctrine to vicarious liability 
doctrines in criminal law are beyond the scope of this Article.14 
Instead, this Article focuses on contributory infringement doctrine 
and the evaluation of a defendant’s contribution to another’s 
infringement—an evaluation that has given courts a great deal of 
trouble. 
There are two types of contributory infringement: knowing 
facilitation and inducement.15 For each type of infringement, the 
 
 11. See 5 PATRY, supra note 1, § 21:41 (“Vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement are discrete doctrines with different elements, and thus it is important to analyze 
a claim under the proper doctrine.”). Although there have been many suggested answers for 
why an employer or other supervisor should be responsible for the tortious conduct of its 
employees, the most frequent suggestion is that vicarious liability is justified by the need to 
distribute losses to solvent parties when direct tortfeasors lack the means to compensate victims 
for their injuries. P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 22 (1967). In 
contrast, contributory liability involves complicated questions of blameworthiness and 
causation that are the exclusive subject of this Article. 
 12. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). To be held vicariously liable for either trademark 
or copyright infringement, the defendant must have the right and ability to control the direct 
infringer and the infringement must translate into a financial benefit for the defendant. Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 13. See John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 130 n.2 
(2007) (distinguishing vicarious responsibility and contributory responsibility by noting that 
being vicariously responsible means responsibility for another’s wrongs “irrespective of one’s 
own participation in them”).  
 14. Principles of vicarious liability for the torts of another date back at least to the 
seventeenth century. THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 19 (1916). On the other hand, 
criminal law rarely imposes liability vicariously. Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the 
Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 398–99 (2008). 
 15. PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
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defendant must possess a particular mental state with regard to the 
infringing act. In addition, for each type of infringement the 
defendant must take some action that contributes to the underlying 
infringement. The content of the mental state and contribution 
requirements vary depending on the type of contributory 
infringement at issue. As described in more detail below, a defendant 
must know of the infringing activity to be liable for knowing 
facilitation, but proof of intent to cause the infringement is not 
necessary. Knowing facilitation also requires the defendant to 
commit some act in furtherance of the directly infringing conduct. 
Even when there is proof of such an act and knowledge of the 
infringing activity, defendants that supply technologies capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses are exempt from knowing facilitation 
liability. In contrast, a defendant must specifically intend for the 
infringement to occur to be liable for inducement. Moreover, no safe 
harbor exists for such a defendant, even if that defendant supplies a 
technology that can be used for noninfringing purposes. 
A. Knowing Facilitation Infringement16 
1. Contours of the knowledge requirement 
Copyright, trademark, and patent law set out two main 
conditions for a finding of knowing facilitation. First, defendants 
must have actual or constructive knowledge that their actions are 
likely to facilitate infringement by another. Second, defendants’ 
actions must materially contribute to the infringement.17 
All three intellectual property regimes prohibit aiding or 
encouraging a direct infringer when the defendant can be expected 
to have some knowledge of the infringing activity. Although 
knowledge that the direct infringer’s acts constitute infringement is 
required for knowing facilitation infringement, proof of intent to 
cause the infringement is not.18 Thus, a defendant that is indifferent 
 
2007).  
 16. Courts refer to the non-inducement variety of contributory infringement in a variety 
of ways. Some merely refer to it as “contributory infringement.” E.g., id. I have chosen the 
term “knowing facilitation” to make clear that it is a subset of contributory infringement. 
 17. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 
(2d Cir. 1971); Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The 
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1363, 1378 (2006). 
 18.  Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. 
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to the presence or absence of infringement may be found 
contributorily liable for patent infringement if it knew that the 
component it was selling could be used to infringe.19 Similarly, the 
owner of a flea market was found contributorily liable for a t-shirt 
vendor’s trademark infringement even though the owner arguably 
had no specific intent that the infringement take place.20 
When actual knowledge is not present, courts investigate 
whether a reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s position 
should have expected infringement.21 Mere suspicion that a 
purchaser of the defendant’s product will use that product to 
infringe is not enough to satisfy the knowledge standard.22 Thus, the 
Supreme Court held that a generic drug manufacturer did not meet 
the knowledge standard for contributory liability merely because it 
suspected that some unknown pharmacists would use its product to 
infringe on comparable trademarked drugs.23 But courts are free to 
use circumstantial evidence to impute knowledge to a defendant. For 
example, the Federal Circuit inferred knowledge of patent 
infringement when the defendant was a manufacturer of component 
parts and the evidence showed that there was no available market for 
those components except in the infringing system.24 In A&M 
Records v. Napster,25 the distributor of peer-to-peer file sharing 
software was found liable for knowing facilitation of infringement.26 
In that case, the trial court inferred knowledge of copyright 
infringement based on the Napster executives’ own illegal 
 
L. REV. 635, 657 (2007); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 19. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 425, 455 (D. Del. 1997) 
(“Actual intent to cause or contribute to infringement is not necessary to establish 
contributory infringement.”). 
 20. Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
 21. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845–46 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
 22. E.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:18 (2008) (“[T]he supplier’s duty does not go so far as to require him to 
refuse to sell to dealers who merely might pass off its goods.”). 
 23. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 (1982) (White, J., 
concurring). 
 24. Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). 
 25. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 26. Id. at 1021–22. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 9:55 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
790 
downloading of copyrighted works and their experience with 
intellectual property rights and the recording industry.27  
For two of the three main categories of intellectual property, a 
safe harbor exists for defendants accused of supplying items that 
facilitate infringement but can also be used for noninfringing 
purposes. The immunity from contributory liability exists even when 
the defendant is aware of the infringing activity. Section 271(c) of 
the Patent Act exempts the supplier of “a staple article or commodity 
of commerce” from liability even when the article is subsequently 
used, with the supplier’s knowledge, for infringement of a patent.28 
Similarly, in copyright law, manufacturers of technologies having 
“substantial noninfringing uses” are exempt from liability even if 
they are aware of the infringing activity.29 No such safe harbor exists 
for accused secondary trademark infringers, although the Lanham 
Act does provide certain limitations on the type of relief granted 
against publishers and printers.30 
2. Material contribution 
Even with actual or constructive knowledge of the direct 
infringer’s behavior, liability for knowing facilitation will not attach 
to a secondary defendant unless the defendant “materially” 
contributed to the infringement.31 All three intellectual property 
regimes require some act by the defendant that contributed to the 
ultimate act of infringement before the defendant can be held 
contributorily liable. For trademark law, this material contribution 
can take the form of manufacturing or distributing the infringing 
product or directly controlling and monitoring the instrumentality 
 
 27. Id. at 1020 n.5.The type of intellectual property at issue has some impact on the 
knowledge requirement. Courts tend to view the knowledge requirement more generously 
when the right at issue is a copyright. E.g., Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 801 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). On the other hand, in trademark law, the knowledge requirement for 
contributory liability is a high standard for a plaintiff to meet; mere awareness of a potential for 
infringement is not enough. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Campuzano, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278–
79 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that a distributor’s awareness of a similar scheme involving 
someone other than the direct infringer is not enough to satisfy knowledge standard for 
contributory liability). 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).  
 29. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2005). 
 31. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir. 
2004); Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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used by the direct actor to infringe.32 Copyright law’s material 
contribution standard is similar,33 although some would argue that 
the direct control and monitoring prong is read more flexibly in the 
copyright context.34 Patent law imposes liability on sellers of 
components or materials used to infringe.35 
The actions listed above are not an exclusive list. The law 
remains frustratingly unclear as to what makes a defendant’s 
contribution material.36 Recently, the imprecise content of the 
material contribution requirement sparked a heated debate among 
the judges of the Ninth Circuit. In two separate Ninth Circuit cases, 
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com and Perfect 10 v. Visa, website operator 
Perfect 10 charged online intermediaries with contributory 
infringement.37 Perfect 10 holds the copyrights to images of nude 
models38 and rights to the trademark “Perfect 10.”39 It operates a 
website that allows subscribers to access the images for a monthly 
fee.40 It maintained that Google and Visa facilitated copyright 
infringement by rival websites that published Perfect 10’s images 
without authorization.41 According to Perfect 10, the Google search 
engine promoted infringement by helping directly infringing 
websites distribute their infringing content, and Visa encouraged 
infringement by processing credit card payments made by consumers 
to the infringing websites.42 In assessing both cases of contributory 
 
 32. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l. Serv. Ass’n., 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 33. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796. 
 34. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1391–94. 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 36. The boundaries of contributory liability are even more uncertain when legal regimes 
outside the United States are considered. See Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in 
Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 248 
(2008). 
 37. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Visa, 494 
F.3d 788. In a third case, Perfect 10 sued another intermediary, an Internet service provider, 
for providing Internet connectivity to the unauthorized websites that posted Perfect 10’s 
copyrighted images. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007). 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
immunized the Internet service provider from liability, pending the district court’s 
determination of certain threshold factual issues. Id. at 1118. 
 38. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 713. 
 39. Visa, 494 F.3d at 793. 
 40. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 713. 
 41.  Id. at 726; Visa, 494 F. 3d. at 796. 
 42. Perfect 10 also contended that Amazon.com promoted infringement by linking to 
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liability, the Ninth Circuit claimed that it applied “the same basic 
test” to examine whether the defendant “materially contribute[d]” 
to that infringement.43 Yet application of that test produced 
dramatically different results. 
In Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit remanded on the issue of 
knowledge, but held that the search engine materially contributed to 
the infringing conduct by helping the rogue websites find an 
audience.44 It suggested that for contributory infringement disputes 
“in the context of cyberspace,” courts must be sensitive to the nature 
of the Internet, which by “facilitat[ing] access to websites 
throughout the world can significantly magnify the effects of 
otherwise immaterial infringing activities.”45 In other words, in the 
Ninth Circuit’s view, contributory liability becomes more likely when 
the defendant transacts business online. 
Less than two months later, the court did an about-face. A 
majority of a three-judge panel held that Visa’s processing of online 
credit payments could not materially contribute to the infringement 
committed by a website that illegally distributed copyrighted images 
and used the plaintiff’s trademark without permission.46 The majority 
contended that Visa’s inability to directly control the content of the 
infringing websites meant that it could not satisfy the material 
contribution standard for either contributory copyright or trademark 
infringement.47 It attempted to distinguish the Amazon.com decision 
by arguing that “location services” are more “material” to 
infringement than “payment services.”48 Yet nothing in the opinion 
explained why a service that helps consumers find infringing content 
is somehow more central to infringement than a service that makes it 
possible for consumers to pay the direct infringer for that infringing 
content. The majority rejected older contributory infringement 
precedents, contending that tests “developed for a brick- and-mortar 
world” were irrelevant.49  
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Kozinksi took a more generous view 
 
Google search engine results. Id. at 712. 
 43. Visa, 494 F.3d at 795. 
 44. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 729. 
 45. Id. at 728. 
 46. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796–800. 
 47. Id. at 805, 807. 
 48. Id. at 797 n.8. 
 49. Id. 
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of the materiality requirement. He contended that the older 
precedents demonstrated that Visa’s actions did satisfy the material 
contribution standard.50 Judge Kozinski maintained that Visa’s 
actions had to be material because there are no adequate payment 
substitutes for credit cards on the Internet,51 and even if substitutes 
existed, the ability to receive credit card payments makes 
infringement possible on a mass scale.52 The different outcomes of 
the two Perfect 10 cases and the split between Judge Kozinski and 
the Visa majority over the definition of material contribution testify 
to the ambiguity surrounding knowing facilitation doctrine. 
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty over the material 
contribution standard, some tentative principles can be gleaned from 
the case law. One established principle provides that some action by 
the defendant is definitely required. Showing that the defendant 
benefited from the infringement is not enough. Nor is it enough to 
demonstrate an action is only obliquely related to the act of 
infringement. For example, a realtor was absolved from contributory 
liability for a client’s copying of copyrighted architectural plans even 
though the realtor allegedly knew of the planned infringing activity 
and received an above-average fee for arranging the sale of an 
unimproved lot where the client built its infringing architectural 
design.53 Despite the evidence of knowledge and benefit, the court 
denied liability because the realtor’s role was too “attenuated” and 
“only tangentially involved in the infringement.”54  
Another principle evident in some of the cases is that materiality 
can be determined by the nature of the relationship between the 
defendant and the direct infringer. The leading treatise on copyright 
law states that the defendant’s action must directly contribute to the 
infringement for there to be liability.55 Similarly, contributory 
trademark infringement also requires “a special, narrowly defined 
relationship between the defendant and [an act of] infringement.”56 
 
 50. Id. at 825 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 814. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 54. Id. at 294. 
 55. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04, at 
12-85 (2008) (“[I]n order to be deemed a contributory infringer, the authorization or 
assistance must bear some direct relationship to the infringing acts . . . .”). 
 56. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 812 (2004). 
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Often the material contribution standard is evaluated through the 
concept of “control.” If the defendant lacks control over the direct 
infringer or the instrumentality used to infringe, courts tend to 
conclude that the material contribution requirement has not been 
satisfied.57 Some cases suggest that a material contribution can be 
found when the defendant provides the site and facilities for the 
infringement to take place, presumably because ownership of such 
facilities creates a relationship of control over the direct infringer.58 
B. Inducement Infringement 
In addition to the knowing facilitation variety of infringement, 
all of the intellectual property regimes recognize some form of 
“inducement” liability where a party will be held responsible if they 
encouraged the direct infringer with the specific intent to cause the 
direct infringer to infringe.59 For example, inducement liability for 
copyright infringement occurs when the defendant distributes a 
technology “with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright.”60 Although there has been some disagreement over the 
type of intent required for inducement liability under patent law, the 
Federal Circuit has recently confirmed that specific intent to infringe 
must be proven.61 Likewise, trademark infringement plaintiffs 
proceeding under an inducement theory must also prove an intent to 
facilitate infringement on the part of the contributory defendant.62 
 
 57. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 
1999); Fare Deals, Ltd., v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (D. Md. 
2001); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (stating 
that a contributory copyright infringer must be “in a position to control the use of copyrighted 
works by others”).  
 58. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714–15 (S.D. Ohio 
2006); Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 293. 
 59. Adams, supra note 18, at 636. 
 60. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 
 61. DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also 
Tal Kedem, Note, Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: Which 
Intentions Pave the Road?, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1488–94 (2007) (arguing for the 
recognition of the specific intent standard). 
 62. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982) (holding that 
secondary trademark liability may be imposed “if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally 
induces another to infringe a trademark”); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 
F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating Visa’s intentional inducement trademark liability 
under same standard as inducement of copyright infringement); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, 
MGM v. Grokster: Judicial Activism or Good Decision?, 74 UMKC L. REV. 921, 942 (2006) 
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The key difference between knowing facilitation liability and 
inducement liability is that inducement liability requires that the 
defendant intend for the direct actor to infringe. Intent is not 
necessary to find the defendant liable for knowing facilitation, which 
only requires that the defendant know or should know of the 
infringement.63  
Just like the material contribution standard for knowing 
facilitation infringement, many uncertainties surround the 
inducement doctrine. First, the mental state requirement for 
inducement is vague. The Supreme Court has offered minimal 
guidance on how to draw the line between actions demonstrating 
culpable intent and actions that fall short.64 The Court also left 
unanswered the question of whether a subjective belief that the 
direct actor’s conduct is not infringing insulates the defendant from 
inducement liability. Indeed, courts have not answered whether a 
defendant could be liable for encouraging another person to copy a 
copyrighted work based on the erroneous belief that the other 
person had a fair use right to the work.65 Similarly, the courts have 
not addressed whether inducement liability will apply when a 
defendant facilitates patent or trademark infringement believing that 
the plaintiff’s patent or trademark is invalid.66  
Second, the courts have not determined what sorts of 
contributions to infringement satisfy the requirements for 
inducement liability. It remains an open question whether 
inducement liability applies only to defendants who distribute an 
infringing device or if it can apply to defendants who facilitate or 
encourage infringement in other ways.67 Moreover, it remains 
 
(stating that “inducing copyright infringement is analogous to inducing trademark 
infringement”). 
 63. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 64. Tiffany A. Parcher, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Grokster and Sony: Using 
Factual Comparisons to Uncover the Legal Rule, 54 UCLA L. REV. 509, 521 (2006). 
 65. Adams, supra note 18, at 635; Parcher, supra note 64, at 522–23. 
 66. Adams, supra note 18, at 635 n.2. 
 67. See Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability 
in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 949–50 & nn.208–09 (2006). Given 
technological changes shaping the distribution of intellectual property and the prevalence of 
user-generated content, intermediaries that do not distribute content themselves are becoming 
increasingly important. Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: 
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 577, 577–78 (2008). Hence, an inducement doctrine that exempts non-distributors 
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unclear whether the same materiality standard required for knowing 
facilitation liability applies or whether inducement plaintiffs may 
dispense with a materiality standard altogether.68 
However, it is clear that when the intent standard for 
inducement liability has been satisfied, the safe harbors for supply of 
substantially noninfringing materials are no longer available. The 
Supreme Court’s recent Grokster decision holds that the safe harbor 
for provision of substantially noninfringing technologies does not 
apply to defendants that “actively induce” infringement.69 In other 
words, those who distribute technologies capable of noninfringing 
uses with the intent of facilitating infringement will be liable. 
Similarly, a defendant found to have actively induced patent 
infringement cannot take advantage of the exemption for 
distribution of a “staple article of commerce.”70  
As illustrated by the rift between the majority and Judge 
Kozinksi in the Visa case and by Table 1 below, the content of the 
contribution standard for both types of contributory infringement 
remains uncertain. Given this uncertainty, courts have turned to legal 
analogies outside of intellectual property law to find purchase for 
their decisions. The next Part describes how the material 
contribution standard is evaluated in determining indirect liability for 
criminal conduct and why this standard should not be applied to civil 
intellectual property disputes. 
 
from liability would fail to capture key intermediaries in the production and dissemination of 
infringing content. 
 68. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n., 494 F.3d 788, 800–02 (9th Cir. 
2007) (indicating that the two types of contributory liability could be described as “material 
contribution liability” and “inducement liability”) with Sumit R. Shah, Note, Modding the 
Web: Secondary Liability Under Copyright and Web Modification Software in a Post-Grokster 
World, 85 TEX. L. REV. 703, 726 n.159 (2007) (suggesting that the Supreme Court is moving 
toward two theories of contributory infringement: “contributory infringement, which is when 
a defendant materially contributes to infringement with knowledge of infringement, and 
inducement of infringement, which is when a defendant purposefully encourages infringement 
in a way that materially contributes to infringement”). 
 69. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–37 (2005). 
 70. Id. at 934–35 & n.10; see also Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 
1336–40 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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TABLE 1 – COMPARISON OF THE TWO TYPES OF CONTRIBUTORY 
INFRINGEMENT 
 Knowing Facilitation Inducement 
 
Mental State 
Requirement 
 
 
 Satisfied by actual or 
constructive knowledge of 
the infringement 
 For patent and copyright, 
safe harbor for supplying 
materials capable of 
substantial noninfringing 
uses 
 
 Defendant must 
specifically intend 
for the direct 
infringer to infringe 
 Unclear whether 
defendant can be 
liable if he or she 
believes that the 
direct infringer’s 
conduct is legal 
 No safe harbor for 
supplying materials 
capable of 
substantial 
noninfringing uses 
 
Contribution 
Requirement 
 Contribution to 
infringement must be 
“material” 
 Satisfied by manufacturing 
or distributing the 
infringing product or 
directly controlling and 
monitoring the 
instrumentality used to 
infringe 
 Unclear what other 
activities are “material” 
 Unclear whether 
“material” standard 
of knowing 
facilitation applies 
or whether a lesser 
standard applies 
  
III. COMPARING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONTRIBUTORY 
LIABILITY TO CRIMINAL LAW CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY 
This Part sketches out the basic requirements for liability as a 
criminal accomplice and compares those requirements to the criteria 
for contributory infringement liability established in Part II. 
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Accomplice liability demands proof not only of the defendant’s 
knowledge of someone else’s criminal act, but compelling proof that 
the defendant intended for that criminal act to occur. By contrast, no 
proof of intent is needed for knowing facilitation infringement. 
Moreover, contributory infringement doctrine demands evidence of 
a significant contribution to the directly infringing activity while 
extremely trivial acts can subject a criminal defendant to accomplice 
liability. 
A. Accomplice Liability Doctrine 
In his dissent in the Visa case, Judge Kozinski raised the 
accomplice liability standards of criminal law as an appropriate 
analogy for determining secondary liability standards for intellectual 
property.71 He argued that Visa satisfied the material contribution 
threshold because its payment processing service facilitates 
infringement in the same manner that the driver of a getaway car or 
the financial backer of a drug deal facilitates a criminal transaction.72 
Like Kozinski, other judges have turned to criminal law analogies to 
solve questions of contributory intellectual property liability.73 
Meanwhile, Congress continues to expand criminal penalties for 
intellectual property violations,74 demonstrating increasing 
acceptance of importing criminal law concepts to intellectual 
property regulation.75 Federal law enforcement agencies have 
 
 71. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. ACEMLA, 424 F.3d 50, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that secondary copyright infringement liability is “a kind of abettor liability” akin 
to similar liability in criminal law); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 
2003) (analogizing contributory copyright infringement to criminal aiding and abetting); Sims 
v. W. Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 1977) (comparing inducer of patent 
infringement to an accessory before the fact); Trs. of Colum. Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics 
GMBH, 272 F. Supp. 2d 90, 104 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that Section 271(b) of the Patent 
Act “is analogous to a criminal statute imposing liability for one who acts as an accessory 
before the fact”); see also Vengegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 196 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (“Our decision to open this issue on remand is by analogy to criminal law. A 
decision in an infringement suit to increase the statutory rate based on a finding of willfulness, 
like an upward departure from a sentencing guideline's range, is a punitive measure meant to 
deter.”).  
 74. See The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
403, §§ 201–206 (2008). 
 75. Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations 
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
167, 172 (2002) (describing “an explosion in recent years in the use of criminal sanctions for 
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recently stepped up investigative efforts and filed more cases for 
crimes involving intellectual property infringement,76 even shifting 
prosecutorial priorities to target the operators of peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks.77 Seeing civil penalties as lacking deterrent effect, 
states are also enacting more criminal laws designed to safeguard the 
interests of intellectual property owners.78 With criminal law 
analogues becoming increasingly important to intellectual property 
right holders,79 an examination of the soundness of applying criminal 
law secondary liability principles to intellectual property is 
appropriate. 
Like intellectual property law, criminal law recognizes liability for 
the actions of others. The doctrine of “accomplice liability” provides 
for the criminal responsibility of one who acts with another in the 
perpetration of a crime.80 The doctrine has a lengthy historical 
pedigree.81 It roughly corresponds to contributory liability in 
 
intellectual property offenses”). Legal scholars suggest that the trend towards greater 
criminalization of intellectual property rights violations can be attributed to the lobbying 
prowess of the entertainment and software industries as well as genuine fears over the 
infringing potential of the Internet and global trade. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A 
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 511 (2d ed. 2006); Michael M. DuBose, Criminal 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-First Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 
481, 482–85 (2006). 
 76. Daniel Newman et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 693, 695 
(2007). In recent years, the Department of Justice has realized a fifty percent increase in 
convictions for intellectual property offenses. Kim F. Nativadad, Note, Stepping It Up and 
Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil and Criminal Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 485 (2008). 
 77. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office W. Dist. of Va., Wise, Virginia Man 
Sentenced in Peer-to-Peer Piracy Crackdown (Oct. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/stanleySent.htm. 
 78. See Newman et al., supra note 76, at 695–96; see also William Triplett, Feds Deliver 
Piracy Conviction, VARIETY, June 29, 2008 (reporting on first jury trial conviction for criminal 
copyright infringement for peer-to-peer file sharing). 
 79. Hogberg, supra note 67, at 943 (discussing application of mens rea requirement in 
criminal statutes to contributory copyright infringement). 
 80. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (6th ed. 1990). Accomplice liability is a particularly 
confusing doctrine because it is referred to by so many different names. Although I use the 
term accomplice liability in this Article because it is the most common term for criminal 
contributory liability, there are several different terms used in different jurisdictions to describe 
a doctrine where a defendant may be convicted of a crime “even though he or she is not the 
actual perpetrator of the criminal act.” See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 162. Alternatively, 
the principles of accomplice liability may be referred to as accountability, criminal aider and 
abettor liability, joint criminal liability, joint criminal venture, acting in concert, complicity, 
and the law of parties. Id. 
 81. See United States v. Peroni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (locating the first 
judicial recognition of the doctrine in fourteenth century English common law); Grace E. 
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intellectual property law, in that, like contributory liability, 
accomplice liability looks to the mental state of the defendant as well 
as his actions to see if they meet the required standard.82 In criminal 
law, the requirement that a defendant commit his wrongful act with 
knowledge and willfulness is referred to as mens rea.83 The 
requirement of a particular wrongful act needed to subject the 
defendant to liability is referred to as actus reus.84  
1. Mens rea 
In the majority of cases, accomplice liability requires that it be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the specific 
intent to cause another to commit the underlying crime.85 There are 
actually two types of mens rea that can be at stake in accomplice 
liability cases.86 First, the law addresses the mens rea of knowingly 
aiding the conduct of another person. For an accomplice liability 
conviction in any jurisdiction, the trier of fact must conclude that the 
defendant knew that its actions were facilitating the activities of 
another.87 Inadvertent or unknowing encouragement or assistance 
will not subject a party to accomplice liability.88 
Second, the law also recognizes the mens rea of having the same 
object as the elements of the underlying crime.89 If the defendant 
 
Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2169, 2169 (1988) 
(“Anglo-American jurisprudence has recognized accomplice liability since its inception.”). 
 82. Also, like intellectual property law, on rare occasions, criminal law imposes vicarious 
liability for the acts of others. Unlike intellectual property law, however, vicarious liability in 
the criminal context has been strictly limited to those occasions when it is specifically required 
by statute, imposes only a mild penalty, and the offense carries no significant moral overtones. 
PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 277 (2d ed. 2002). 
 83. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943). 
 84. LOW, supra note 82, at 266–67. 
 85. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 579–80 (2d ed. 
1986). In some jurisdictions, merely knowingly doing things that help others commit crimes is 
enough to subject the party to liability. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1174 & n.295 (2005). 
 86. Moore, supra note 14, at 396; Tyler B. Robinson, Note, A Question of Intent: 
Aiding and Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice Liability Under § 924(c), 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 783, 792 (1997). 
 87. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2 (2d ed. 2003). 
 88. Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449 (1893); State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265, 
268 (Mo. 1970) (en banc). 
 89. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c) (“The prevailing view is that the accomplice must 
also have the mental state required for the crime of which he is to be convicted on an 
accomplice theory.”); Mueller, supra note 81, at 2169. 
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intends to aid or encourage the commission of the direct actor’s 
crime, then sufficient intent exists to establish accomplice liability. 
But if the defendant lacks the same intent to commit a particular 
crime as the direct actor, then there usually can be no accomplice 
liability.90 For example, in order for an accomplice to be convicted of 
the crime of mayhem, which requires a specific intent to maim, it is 
not enough for the prosecution to prove intent to aid a battery. 
Rather, the prosecution must demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intended for maiming to occur through his 
assistance or encouragement to the direct actor.91 
Sometimes the defendant may not intend for the crime to 
happen but is aware that her conduct facilitates the crime. In two 
limited circumstances, this awareness may satisfy the mens rea 
requirement. First, courts sometimes permit accomplice liability for 
only knowingly, not intentionally, rendering aid if the crime is 
especially serious or dangerous.92 Knowing but unintentional aid to a 
group planning to rob a bank or commit treason may suffice for 
accomplice liability.93 But such aid is insufficient for cases involving 
gambling,94 unlawful sale of alcohol,95 or the majority of other 
crimes.96  
Second, in the relatively rare circumstance of those crimes not 
requiring proof of either the perpetrator’s criminal purpose or 
knowledge that his behavior would almost certainly cause the 
prohibited result,97 accomplice liability may be found without 
 
 90. United States v. Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 91. Commonwealth v. Hogan, 396 N.E.2d 978, 979–80 (Mass. 1979). 
 92. LOW, supra note 82, at 271; CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW 
FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 213–14 (2000).  
 93. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 346–49 (1870) (treason); Regina v. Bainbridge, 1 
Q.B. 129, 130–32 (1960) (U.K.) (bank robbery). 
 94. State ex rel. Dooley v. Coleman, 170 So. 722, 723 (Fla. 1936). 
 95. Graves v. Johnson, 60 N.E. 383, 383 (Mass. 1901). 
 96. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994) (suggesting that the 
default rule under the common law is for every crime to require evil intent for the crime to 
occur on the part of the defendant); KUTZ, supra note 92, at 213–14; G. Robert Blakey & 
Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on 
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1345, 1389–90 (1996) (“The federal courts of appeals now uniformly use ‘intent’ as 
the necessary state of mind for accomplice liability . . . .”). But see Baruch Weiss, What Were 
They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1373 (2002) (contending that some federal courts fail to apply 
the intent standard for mens rea for aiding and abetting crimes). 
 97. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 213–14 (“[A]lmost all felonies require more than mere 
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specific intent to facilitate the crime.98 For accomplice liability to 
hold, however, a more limited form of intent must be proven. The 
prosecution must show that the defendant intended to commit the 
act that facilitated the perpetrator’s actions and intended to aid the 
perpetrator in the actions that ultimately resulted in the crime.99 For 
example, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that someone 
who drove the perpetrator of a killing to the victim’s home to 
forcibly collect a gambling debt could be found guilty as an 
accomplice to reckless manslaughter.100 The defense argued that the 
mens rea requirement for accomplice liability could not be satisfied 
because the defendant was a good friend of the victim and would 
never have intended to help the perpetrator kill his friend.101 The 
Court disagreed, holding that intent to facilitate a killing is not 
required for accomplice liability for reckless manslaughter:  
[W]e do not require that the complicitor himself intend to commit 
the crime that the principal commits for crimes defined in terms of 
recklessness and negligence. In those cases, the complicitor must 
only intend to aid or assist the principal to engage in conduct that 
“grossly deviates from the standard of reasonable care and poses a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another.”102  
Not all courts permit accomplice liability for crimes of recklessness or 
negligence, however; some even deem this analytically impossible.103 
 
knowledge on the part of [the perpetrator].”). 
 98. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2; Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for 
Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1351, 1368 (1998). For example, a defendant who intended to encourage his brother to 
discharge a weapon into a crowd but did not necessarily intend for anyone to die could be 
found guilty of second-degree murder when the shot resulted in death. State v. Garnica, 98 
P.3d 207, 209–13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). But see, e.g., State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870, 874–
75 (N.H. 1984) (holding that it is impossible for someone to be an accomplice to an 
unintentional crime), superseded by statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8 (2001), as 
recognized in State v. Anthony, 861 A.2d 773 (2004). 
 99. Rogers, supra note 98, at 1368. 
 100. Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1282–85 (Colo. 2005). 
 101. Id. at 1282. 
 102. Id. at 1285 (quoting Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1997)). 
 103. E.g., Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874–75; People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842, 843–44 
(Mich. 1961) (no conviction for being an accomplice to vehicular manslaughter); Maughon v. 
State, 71 S.E. 922, 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911). But see People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344, 
347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (accomplice convicted for encouraging vehicular manslaughter in 
drag racing competition); State v. McVay, 132 A. 436, 439 (R.I. 1926). There is also 
disagreement on this issue among the limited group of scholars that have studied the question 
of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes. See Rogers, supra note 98, at 1371. Some 
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Courts are particularly reluctant to find accomplice liability 
without specific intent for strict liability crimes.104 The doctrine is not 
uniform from state to state, but the prevailing rule is that even 
though the principal charged with a strict liability criminal offense 
may be convicted without evidence of a particular mental state, an 
accused accomplice will not be liable without proof of intent to 
facilitate commission of the strict liability crime.105 At the least, proof 
must exist that the defendant intended to aid the principal in her 
actions.106 Courts typically refuse to apply the doctrine of accomplice 
liability to defendants who knowingly but unintentionally aid others 
in strict liability crimes.107 For example, although possessing illegal 
machine guns is a strict liability criminal offense, someone will not be 
liable as an accomplice to that crime unless there is proof of the 
accomplice’s “intent to aid” and “desire to bring about the illegal 
possession of machine guns.”108  
Thus, unlike prosecutions for accomplice liability for underlying 
intentional crimes, specific intent to facilitate the actual crime itself is 
not necessarily required for acting as an accomplice to a crime of 
recklessness, negligence, or strict liability, but the accomplice must 
intend to aid the proscribed activity.109 Accomplice liability for 
involuntary manslaughter provides a good illustration of the 
doctrine. Although it is unlikely that someone could possess 
sufficient intent for conviction as an accomplice to involuntary 
manslaughter when the killing resulted from a sudden and 
unpremeditated blow, accomplice liability can exist for involuntary 
 
scholars also disagree as to the consistency of the accomplice liability case law in this area. See 
Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 372 & n.5 
(1997); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 637 n.100 (1984); 
Weiss, supra note 96, at 1351 (describing case law on accomplice’s required mental state as 
“chaos”). 
 104. In general, strict liability criminal offenses are disfavored. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.05 cmt. (1985) (stating that strict liability is per se inappropriate whenever the offense 
carries the possibility of probation or imprisonment). Nevertheless, for a very limited number 
of crimes, no proof of a culpable mental state is required for conviction of the principal actor. 
For example, a business may be criminally liable for distributing misbranded or adulterated 
drugs even though it had no knowledge or intent that such distribution would occur. United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). 
 105. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c). 
 106.  Rogers, supra note 98, 1368. 
 107. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c); Kadish, supra note 12, at 347 n.48. 
 108. United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 109. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c). 
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manslaughter when the killing results from a grossly negligent act 
and the accomplice intended to encourage that negligent act.110 For 
example, when a defendant intentionally encouraged a boat’s captain 
and engineer to use a boiler that the defendant knew was old and 
worn, the defendant could be held liable as an accomplice when the 
boiler exploded and killed several ship passengers.111 Even though 
the defendant did not intend to kill the passengers, he did specifically 
intend for the old and worn boiler to be used in a manner that put 
the passengers at risk.112 
Apart from these two exceptions, which are not always 
recognized, the law demands proof that the accused accomplice 
subjectively intended for the crime to occur. The requirement of 
intent to bring about the underlying criminal act for accomplice 
liability has been adopted by all federal circuits,113 as well as most 
state courts.114 Even when the underlying crime is an unintentional 
one or particularly threatening to public safety, an accomplice must 
somehow associate himself with the criminal venture and want it to 
succeed in order to trigger liability.115 
2. Actus reus 
Accomplice liability also requires a particular wrongful deed, 
known as actus reus, in order to subject the defendant to liability. 
The actus reus of accomplice liability corresponds to the 
contribution requirement for contributory infringement. A 
defendant is liable for the crime of another if, with the intent to 
facilitate the commission of the crime, he “gave assistance or  
 
 110. State v. McVay, 132 A. 436, 437–38 (R.I. 1926). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 114. E.g., People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842, 843–44 (Mich. 1961); State v. Gartland, 
263 S.W. 165, 170–71 (Mo. 1924). Most state accomplice liability statutes are in agreement, 
although some interstate disagreement continues to exist regarding accomplice liability for the 
furtherance of negligent acts. See LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(b). Some jurisdictions permit 
a lesser type of liability called “criminal facilitation” for knowingly but unintentionally 
rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a crime. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.05 
(McKinney 2009). 
 115. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(b); e.g., State v. Vincent, 479 A.2d 237, 243 (Conn. 
1984) (“An accessory must have both the intent to help the principal and the intent to commit 
the crime.”). 
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encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent it . . . 
.”116 As one scholar has put it, “To be an accomplice, my act must 
have something to do with why, how, or with what ease the legally 
prohibited result was brought about by someone else.”117  
Although the accused accomplice must have “something to do” 
with the underlying crime, the actus reus requirement is of secondary 
importance as compared to the mens rea standard.118 As one court of 
appeals remarked, it “does not take much to satisfy” the actus reus 
standard in an accomplice liability case.119 “The most trivial assistance 
is sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for the 
actions of the primary actor.”120 “Proof of any form of participation” 
is enough to support a conviction for accomplice liability, provided 
the requisite mental state has been established.121 Thus, relatively 
unimportant acts of assistance like preparing a meal for the 
perpetrator,122 taking care of the perpetrator’s child while he 
 
 116. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1985). In the 
past, accomplice liability actually referred to three separate types of liability. A “principal in the 
second degree” provided aid to the actual perpetrator and was “present” at the commission of 
the crime. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 860 (3d ed. 1996); 
LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.1. An “accessory before the fact” was someone who aided the 
actual perpetrator in committing the felony but was not actually present at the scene. KAPLAN 
ET AL., supra; LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.1. An “accessory after the fact” did not aid the 
perpetrator in committing the crime, but did assist him in avoiding capture afterwards. 
KAPLAN ET AL., supra at 861. The complexity inherent in categorizing contributory behavior 
into these three different types of liability eventually caused most jurisdictions to abandon the 
three distinctions in accomplice liability. Now, except for accessories after the fact, “all parties 
to the crime face prosecution for the substantive crime itself and thus face the same 
punishment or range of punishments.” Id.  
 117. Moore, supra note 14, at 401. 
 118. Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: 
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 102 (1985); Robinson, supra note 86, 
at 793. 
 119. United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States 
v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 
711, 722 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The requirement that one who aids and abets a crime must 
contribute to its success should not be understood too literally . . . .”). 
 120. Dressler, supra note 118, at 102. 
 121. State v. Gonzalez-Gongora, 673 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); see also 
Cannon v. State, 904 P.2d 89, 100 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (“Only slight participation is 
needed to change a person's status from mere spectator to aider and abettor.”); 
Commonwealth v. Savage, 695 A.2d 820, 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“An accomplice must 
have done something to participate in the venture. However, the least degree of concert or 
collusion in the commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as 
an accomplice.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Calderini, 611 A.2d 206, 207–08 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992)). 
 122. Alexander v. State, 102 So. 597, 598 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925). 
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commits the underlying crime,123 lending the perpetrator a shirt,124 
or even being present and applauding the perpetrator’s criminal 
act125 can satisfy the actus reus standard.  
One question the courts have wrestled with is whether an 
accused accomplice may be convicted for selling goods to a buyer in 
the ordinary course of business when the retailer is aware that the 
buyer intends to use the goods to commit a crime.126 By and large, a 
seller of retail goods that provides materials for a crime may be held 
liable as an accomplice.127 As one court explained, “One who sells a 
gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder, 
would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by 
showing that he received full price for the gun . . . .”128 What is 
essential is a determination that the retailer had the required mens 
rea, i.e., intent to sell the instrumentality for use in a criminal 
endeavor. 
The case law governing retail sales of instruments used to 
accomplish crimes demonstrates the lax standards courts apply in 
determining whether the actus reus for accomplice liability has been 
satisfied. Courts typically assume that a defendant’s selling an 
instrumentality used to commit a crime is sufficient to satisfy the 
actus reus requirement.129 While proof of some affirmative act is 
required so that the law does not punish the accomplice for mere 
thoughts in sympathy with the commission of a crime,130 the 
 
 123. State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188, 188–89 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). 
 124. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 677–78 (1978) (recounting a 
German case where the court found that the defendant’s lending a smock to his friend so that 
he would not stain his clothes while beating someone up was sufficient for accomplice 
liability).  
 125. See Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B.) (U.K.). 
 126. Rogers, supra note 98, at 1358; Candace Courteau, Comment, The Mental Element 
Required for Accomplice Liability: A Topic Note, 59 LA. L. REV. 325, 345 (1998). 
 127. In some states, the retailer will be punished as an accomplice while in others, the 
retailer is liable but under a separate criminal statute for “knowing facilitation,” which carries a 
reduced penalty. Mueller, supra note 81, at 2187.  
 128. Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940). 
 129. See e.g., id. (“[T]hose who make a profit by furnishing to criminals, whether by sale 
or otherwise, the means to carry on their nefarious undertakings aid them just as truly as if they 
were actual partners with them . . . .”); Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 462 A.2d 573, 
588–90 (N.J. 1983) (allowing criminal prosecution for sale of drug paraphernalia with 
knowledge of purchaser’s intent to use with controlled substances). 
 130. For accomplice liability, there must be some action that demonstrates that the 
defendant expressly or impliedly gave her assent to the underlying crime. State v. Burgess, 96 
S.E.2d 54, 57–59 (N.C. 1957). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 9:55 AM 
783 Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines 
 807 
determination of whether the accomplice had the intent to 
contribute to the criminal act is the essential piece of the accomplice 
liability puzzle, not actus reus.131 When retailers are charged as 
accomplices, the cases often boil down to one central question: the 
retailer’s intent.132 In essence, accomplice liability is designed to 
punish the accomplice for his intent to contribute, not for his actions 
in furtherance of the principal’s crime.133  
B. Comparison with Contributory Infringement Doctrine 
As it stands currently, contributory infringement law does not 
require the strong showings of intent required for accomplice 
liability in criminal law. Specific intent to facilitate a crime is usually 
required for accomplice liability.134 By contrast, intent to bring about 
the ultimate act of infringement is only necessary for inducement 
infringement liability, not for knowing facilitation infringement. 
Moreover, while both contributory liability doctrines allow the 
defendant’s mental state to be inferred through circumstantial 
evidence, infringement law takes a comparatively generous approach 
in determining what evidence is probative of knowledge of the 
underlying illegal act. Most importantly, accomplice liability places 
little stock in the actus reus requirement while contributory 
infringement decisions often hinge on whether the defendant’s 
actions were “material” enough to justify liability. 
These are important doctrinal differences. Mental states that 
 
 131. Weiss, supra note 96, at 1347–48 (“Because virtually any act of assistance, no matter 
how insubstantial, satisfies the ‘act’ element . . . the mental element is really what defines the 
aider and abettor.”). 
 132. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), a case involving contributory 
copyright infringement, Justice Holmes provided some background on retailer liability as 
criminal accomplices:  
In some cases where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice 
questions may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an 
accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the buyer. It has been held that 
mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller that 
the buyer of spirituous liquor in contemplating such unlawful use is not 
enough to connect him with the possible unlawful consequences but that 
if the sale was made with a view to the illegal resale, the price could not 
be recovered. 
 Id. at 62–63.  
 133. Robinson, supra note 86, at 793 (“[I]t is the principal’s commission of the offense, 
and not the acts of assistance or influence, for which the accomplice is punished.”). 
 134. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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would be insufficient to trigger criminal accomplice liability are 
sufficient for purposes of contributory infringement liability. A 
defendant may be liable for contributory infringement without proof 
that she intended for the direct actor to infringe.135 On the other 
hand, the prosecution in an accomplice liability case must 
demonstrate that the defendant had the specific intent to cause the 
underlying crime to be committed.136 Thus, someone who helped 
the direct actor falsify corporate records could not be held liable as 
an accessory for the direct actor’s filing of a fraudulent tax return 
based on those records without evidence that the defendant 
“contemplated” the filing of the fraudulent returns.137 Giving 
assistance with mere “knowledge of the perpetrator’s general 
criminal purpose” is not enough; there must be proof of intent to 
further the perpetrator’s particular crime.138 
By contrast, contributory infringement defendants can be held 
liable even if they had no specific knowledge that infringement was 
taking place. For example, a defendant accused of knowing 
facilitation of trademark infringement will be liable for failing to take 
precautionary measures if it can be reasonably expected to know that 
someone is using its product to infringe.139 Thus, the manufacturer 
 
 135. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 
1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (where the defendant “had the intent to induce the specific 
acts constituting infringement, intent additionally to cause an infringement can be presumed”); 
see also Hogberg, supra note 67, at 950–51 (contrasting the specific intent requirement for 
inducement infringement liability with the lack of such a requirement for standard 
contributory infringement liability). Direct infringement of intellectual property rights is a 
strict liability offense. One may be directly liable for trademark, copyright, or patent 
infringement without having any knowledge or intent that the infringement took place. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (copyrights); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a) (2000) (patents); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1483, 1497 (2007) (“U.S. copyright law ostensibly establishes a standard of strict 
liability; the mental state of a putative infringer is irrelevant to the issue of direct liability. 
Courts have interpreted liability under the Copyright Act very broadly, ruling that it requires 
neither intent nor knowledge, thus making even unconscious copying actionable.”); Roger D. 
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual 
Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (“Because patent infringement [like copyright 
and trademark infringement] is a strict liability tort, the patentee may enjoin the unauthorized 
manufacture, use, or sale of the invention, regardless of the infringer's state of mind.”). 
 136. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 137. People v. Weiss, 256 A.D. 162, 163 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939), aff’d 21 N.E.2d 212 
(N.Y. 1939). 
 138. People v. Baldera, 711 P.2d 480, 508 (Cal. 1985). 
 139. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 985 (D. Mass. 
1946); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (citing Snow 
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of “Polar Cola” could be liable for trademark infringement if it 
should have expected that bars purchasing its product were 
substituting “Polar Cola” when customers ordered “Coke.”140 The 
mental state requirement for knowing facilitation of copyright 
infringement is similar. Intent to facilitate infringement is not 
required. Instead, the standard for the knowledge requirement is 
objective. Courts ask if the defendant had “constructive knowledge” 
or “apparent knowledge” of the infringing activity.141 By holding 
contributory defendants to an objective standard, contributory 
infringement doctrine encourages businesses to adopt reasonable 
precautions when engaging in transactions affecting intellectual 
property and discourages businesses from intentionally avoiding 
evidence of infringement.142 
Another significant difference between the two indirect liability 
doctrines can be found in the way courts interpret evidence of 
mental state. For contributory liability of intellectual property 
infringement, knowledge of the direct actor’s infringing activity can 
be inferred from ambiguous evidence.143 For example, knowledge of 
copyright infringement was “imputed to an advertising agency 
because its client, the direct infringer, exhibited the ‘well known 
indicia of the fly-by-night operator—smallness, lack of permanent 
location, and financial unreliability’ . . . .”144 In addition, knowledge 
will be imputed for purposes of contributory trademark liability 
when a defendant landowner has reason to suspect that a vendor is 
selling infringing goods on its property.145  
Courts have begun to rely on new types of evidence to satisfy the 
knowledge requirement. According to recent decisions, an indirect 
financial benefit from the direct copyright infringer’s conduct is 
evidence of a culpable mental state. For example, in Grokster, in 
 
Crest with approval). 
 140. Coca-Cola Co., 64 F. Supp. at 985. 
 141. Cable/Home Commc’ns Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th 
Cir. 1990); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 142. 5 PATRY, supra note 1, § 21:47. 
 143. See Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and 
Contributory Infringement: From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58 
S.M.U. L. REV. 357, 373, 383–84 (2005). 
 144. Id. (quoting Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. 
Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
 145. Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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determining whether the mental state requirement for contributory 
liability was met, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Grokster’s 
business model, pointing out that because Grokster relied on 
advertising to turn a profit from its free file-sharing service, it 
received a financial benefit as more users joined its network and it 
could charge more for advertising.146 The Court reasoned that 
because the vast majority of activity on the network involved 
infringement of copyrighted works, Grokster’s business model 
depended on infringement and such a business model was powerful 
evidence that a court could rely on in imputing knowledge of the 
direct infringers’ conduct.147 In addition, particularly in the online 
context, courts read a business’s failure to take prophylactic measures 
against downstream infringement as evidence of a culpable mental 
state. For example, the Seventh Circuit held a file-sharing service 
liable, in part, because the service did not demonstrate that it would 
have been disproportionately costly to employ a filtering device to 
prevent illegal downloading of copyrighted content.148 Other 
contributory infringement decisions have relied on a defendant’s 
failure to implement technological safeguards as evidence of a guilty 
mind.149 
Criminal law, however, takes the mens rea requirement quite 
seriously and the state faces a heavy burden of proof in 
demonstrating the defendant’s culpable state of mind. Although 
circumstantial evidence can be used to determine the mens rea for 
accomplice liability,150 the courts are selective as to what evidence 
warrants an inference of intent to facilitate the crime of another. Not 
 
 146. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912, 939–40 (2005). Although the 
Court contended that it was articulating a standard for the inducement type of contributory 
infringement, it seems that its reasoning should also apply to knowing facilitation 
infringement. Given the inducement doctrine’s requirement of a specific intent to infringe, any 
evidence probative of a culpable mental state in that context should also be probative in the 
context of knowing facilitation infringement.  
 147. Id. 
 148. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 149. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939; Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 
936882, at *6–*7 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 21, 2005); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “a service provider’s knowing failure to 
prevent infringing actions could be the basis for imposing contributory liability”); Tiffany, Inc. 
v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding internet auctioneer not 
contributorily liable for trademark infringement, in part because of the technological measures 
it undertook to prevent counterfeiting). 
 150. See Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 629 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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only must the prosecution demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant intended to facilitate the underlying criminal act, 
but criminal law courts are loathe to find the mens rea requirement 
satisfied from speculative evidence. Take, for example, the case of a 
defendant charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in 
kidnapping.151 Although there was uncontroverted evidence that a 
passenger riding in the defendant’s car pointed a gun at the 
defendant’s ex-girlfriend’s current boyfriend, causing the boyfriend 
to flee, that the defendant took advantage of the situation by 
grabbing his ex-girlfriend and placing her in his vehicle, that he 
immediately drove with her to the U.S.-Mexico border, and that he 
threatened to kill her if she revealed the kidnapping to the 
authorities, the Ninth Circuit overturned a conviction for aiding and 
abetting.152 Despite this evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
it was possible for a jury to find that the defendant did not 
“consciously and intentionally” assist the passenger in using a firearm 
to kidnap his ex-wife.153 Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
refused to find a defendant indirectly liable for trafficking in 
methamphetamines even though it was demonstrated that the 
defendant tried to shoplift over 500 tablets of over-the-counter 
medication containing the ingredients for making 
methamphetamine, that another party had offered to purchase these 
tablets from the defendant, and that the defendant had sold this 
medication to the same party in the past with knowledge that it 
would be used to make methamphetamines.154 Although seemingly 
strong evidence existed suggesting that the defendant possessed the 
required mindset, both courts concluded that more evidence was 
needed before the defendant could be liable as an accomplice.155 
 
 151. United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429–30 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. State v. Maldanado, 114 P.3d 379, 380–82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). 
 155. See also Gains v. State, 417 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the driver of 
a getaway car avoided liability for armed robbery, even though he led police on a chase away 
from the scene of the robbery, because the court deemed the proof insufficient to prove that 
the driver was “a knowing participant in the crime”); People v. Burrel, 235 N.W. 170, 170–71 
(Mich. 1931) (court refused to convict the driver of a car as an accomplice to statutory rape 
even though he drove the car onto a dark street, parked the car, and “sat in the front seat with 
arms over the steering wheel and his head resting on his arms” while the rape occurred in the 
back seat); People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003) (evidence that the defendant lay 
in wait with the perpetrator of a murder to attack the victim was insufficient to find the mens 
rea necessary for an accomplice liability conviction under a New York statute for “depraved 
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Finally, as it stands today, contributory infringement doctrine 
requires a rigorous analysis of the contribution requirement. 
Although the doctrine has not defined exactly what makes a 
contribution “material,” courts analyze this requirement with great 
care. In the Visa case, the knowledge standard was not even 
evaluated as the court battled only over whether or not Visa 
materially contributed to the infringing behavior.156 By contrast, the 
contribution requirement for accomplice liability can be satisfied by 
innocuous actions and means little in comparison with the mens rea 
requirement.157 Table 2 below summarizes the differences between 
accomplice liability and current contributory infringement doctrine. 
 
indifference murder”). 
 156. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n., 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 157. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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TABLE 2 – COMPARISON OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND 
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 
 Accomplice Liability 
Contributory Infringement 
Liability 
Mental State 
Requirement 
 For most criminal acts, 
mens rea requires that 
contributory defendant 
specifically intend to 
facilitate crime 
 Courts reluctant to 
speculate as to state of 
defendant’s mind 
 No proof of intent to facilitate 
infringement needed for 
knowing facilitation 
infringement 
 Circumstantial evidence 
generously interpreted, 
including failure to install anti-
infringement safeguards and 
receipt of a financial benefit 
from infringement 
 
Contribution 
Requirement 
 Actus reus requirement 
is minimal, does not 
require causation  
 May be satisfied by 
conduct unessential to 
the criminal activity, 
including provision of 
food, clothing, child 
care, or applause for the 
perpetrator  
 Rigorous requirement that can 
exempt defendant from liability 
even if mental state 
requirement has been satisfied 
 Contours of requirement 
remain unclear 
 Courts rely at various times on 
“control;” provision of site, 
services, or components for 
infringement; “directness” of 
defendant’s relationship with 
actual infringer 
 
Given these significant differences between contributory 
infringement law and accomplice liability, Judge Kozinski’s appeal to 
criminal law analogies makes little sense. In making the argument 
that the material assistance prong for contributory copyright and 
trademark liability simply turns on whether the conduct substantially 
assists the infringement, not on what he argued were superfluous 
distinctions made by the majority, Judge Kozinksi pointed to 
examples from accomplice liability. He explained that criminal courts 
have no problem in finding that those who knowingly lend money to 
drug dealers or drive a principal to the scene of a crime are 
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substantially contributing to criminal activity.158 By offering these 
criminal law analogies, Judge Kozinski implied that criminal law and 
intellectual property law apply the same standards in determining 
what indirect activities are sufficient to trigger liability for the legal 
violations of another.159 But accomplice liability standards largely 
omit rigorous consideration of the actus reus requirement. Instead, 
the defendant’s actions are only an afterthought once the mens rea 
requirement has been satisfied. By contrast, contributory 
infringement law places great emphasis on the material contribution 
requirement. Thus, intellectual property and criminal law differ 
dramatically as to what activities are sufficient to result in indirect 
liability.160 While criminal contributory liability demands a higher 
degree of mental culpability and greater proof of that culpability than 
contributory infringement, intellectual property doctrine places a 
higher burden on the plaintiff to satisfy the contribution 
requirement. The next part addresses whether contributory 
infringement doctrine should be revised to match the standards for 
accomplice liability. 
IV. WHY THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND 
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT FAILS 
Many scholars have tried to find an underlying unity in both civil 
and criminal law.161 In Anglo-American law, both legal doctrines 
share a common origin with tort law being derived from early 
 
 158. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815. 
 159. Id. 
 160. A somewhat different calculation is involved in construing the scope of statutes 
imposing criminal liability for infringement. The No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
506(a)(2), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05, provide 
criminal penalties for certain acts of copyright infringement. To determine if certain acts of 
encouragement or facilitation trigger these criminal sanctions, a court would need to consult 
traditional criminal accomplice liability standards. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of 
Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. 
L. REV. 731, 743 (2003). While imposition of criminal liability for certain intellectual property 
crimes has proved controversial, see id. at 733 (maintaining that it is unacceptable to treat 
copyright infringement for personal use as a crime); Green, supra note 75, at 241 (stating that 
criminal penalties for intellectual property infringement seem out of place); I. Trotter Hardy, 
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 340–41 (2002) 
(“Unfortunately, though, the ‘social attractiveness’ of greater criminalization may only be 
apparent to legislators, law enforcement agencies, and those industries that depend on owning 
and protecting copyrights.”), this Article is concerned with the use of accomplice liability 
analogies to determine the scope of the civil doctrine of contributory infringement. 
 161. Hall, supra note 9, at 753. 
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English criminal law.162 Both bodies of law use many of the same 
terms (e.g., assault, battery, conspiracy, fraud, defamation, and 
trespass).163 A single action by a defendant may give rise to both 
criminal and tort suits.164 Such commonalities led Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to conclude that, “the general principles of criminal law and 
civil liability are the same.”165 
Nevertheless, the differences between criminal law and the law of 
another discrete set of legal wrongs, intellectual property 
infringement, are more striking than the similarities. Just because 
courts are willing to hold babysitters, cooks, and those who applaud 
illegal activity liable as criminal accomplices, this does not mean that 
the bar for material contribution should be set at the same level in 
the context of civil infringement. In this Part, I discuss why 
accomplice liability principles are a poor fit for contributory 
infringement.  
Secondary liability doctrines determine responsibility in different 
ways. In ancient times, contributory liability often depended on the 
defendant’s physical presence during another’s wrongful act.166 Some 
of the more modern doctrines, like vicarious liability, assess 
responsibility on the basis of the defendant’s relationship with the 
direct actor, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge or participation 
in the wrongful activity.167 Unless the defendant and the direct actor 
fall into one of three relationships—master and servant, principal and 
agent, or employer and independent contractor—the defendant 
cannot be vicariously liable in tort.168 Similarly, under the doctrine of 
conspiracy, a defendant may become liable for the actions of another 
by joining in a complicit relationship with other wrongful actors.169 
 
 162. Nathan Isaacs Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
241, 250 (2005). 
 163. See, e.g., Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd., 618 S.E.2d 768, 773 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), 
aff’d 627 S.E.2d 462 (N.C. 2006) (explaining that “exclusivity of possession” is the basis for 
both civil and criminal trespass actions); 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 
381 (10th ed. 2006) (recognizing that in tort actions for assault and battery, the California 
courts assume that criminal code definitions of “assault” and “battery” are applicable). 
 164. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 33 
(2004). 
 165. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 44 (1881). 
 166. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts—Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
315, 322 (1894). 
 167. ATIYAH, supra note 11, at 3. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also IZHAK 
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Other civil law doctrines impose liability, without a particular 
relationship requirement, when the defendant stands to benefit from 
the loss attributable to the direct actor’s behavior.170  
Criminal law determines the liability of accomplices by measuring 
the nexus between the accomplice’s mental state and the ultimate 
criminal action. Unless the accomplice specifically intends for the 
perpetrator’s criminal behavior to occur, there is no liability. The 
nexus requirement furthers the retributive goals of criminal law by 
ensuring that the defendant unambiguously endorses the 
perpetrator’s criminal activity. Such an approach to contributory 
liability is not available in the context of intellectual property, 
however. Evidentiary hurdles and theoretical differences between 
intellectual property and criminal law demand a separate 
methodology for determining contributory infringement. In Part V, 
I propose that contributory infringement liability be grounded on a 
different metric: causation. Before suggesting a new method for 
analyzing these types of intellectual property cases, however, the 
following material explains why accomplice liability doctrine cannot 
cure what ails contributory infringement law. 
A. Accomplice Liability’s Nexus Between Defendant’s Mental State 
and the Illegal Action 
When multiple actors participate in the same socially undesired 
enterprise, the law must determine when an actor is sufficiently 
involved to face legal consequences. Criminal law assesses liability by 
examining the strength of the link between the mental state of the 
actor and the ultimate illegal act. For the actual perpetrator of the 
illegal act, this is a relatively easy question. Assuming that the 
perpetrator intends his actions, the link between the perpetrator’s 
mental state and the ultimate illegal act is as strong as it can be. 
Things get trickier when a court must analyze the nexus between 
the defendant’s mental state and an illegal act committed by another 
party. It is unlikely that there is a complete overlap between the 
mental state of the secondary party and the illegal action performed 
by the direct actor. People participating in group activity rarely 
 
ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 175 (1993) (discussing the use of “special 
relationships” in tort law to impose a duty of particular persons to prevent deliberate acts of 
wrongdoing by another). 
 170. See Fleming James, Jr., Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. 
REV. 293, 297 (1958). 
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organize in perfect unanimity towards identical shared goals.171 
Individuals may agree to work together, but each brings their own 
expectations, intuitions, and motivations to the project. 
Nevertheless, accomplice liability doctrine mandates a tight nexus 
between the defendant’s mindset and the ultimate crime. As 
discussed above, unless the defendant specifically intends for the 
criminal act to take place (or at least intends for the direct actor to 
behave in a way that is practically certain to lead to the criminal act), 
there is usually no liability.172 
The justification for requiring such a tight nexus between the 
defendant’s mental state and the act of another lies in the animating 
philosophy behind criminal sanctions. Historically, the primary 
justification for criminal punishment has been the theory of 
retribution,173 which theorizes that criminal law exists to punish 
morally inappropriate behavior.174 Under retributivist theory, the 
state sets limits on freedom of action according to moral concerns.175 
The social norms of the community shape the boundaries of criminal 
conduct.176 Criminal punishment serves a civic purpose by expressing 
the state’s indignation and disapproval of the defendant’s conduct 
and vindicating the victim’s autonomous rights in life or property.177  
Under retributivist theory, accomplice liability is designed to 
punish those who unmistakably support the same criminal act as the 
perpetrator even if they do not commit the act themselves.178 
 
 171. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 90. 
 172. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 173. Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 
450 (characterizing this as the “prevailing view among criminal law theorists for a half-century 
or more”).  
 174. Moohr, supra note 160, at 748; see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, 
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 395 (2d ed. 1985) (describing retribution as “the principle that the 
severity of punishment is to be measured by the wickedness of the criminal”). 
 175. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
81–82 (1883) (“The criminal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to 
hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals 
punishments which express it.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of 
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1885 (2007) (“[W]e usually think of criminal law as 
condemning acts that are regarded as unambiguously immoral.”). 
 176. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 
(1999) (explaining the difference between illegal theft and legal competition as their placement 
“against the background of social norms”). 
 177. JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 98, 100–05 (1970). 
 178. See Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 (explaining that “[d]esert is calculated by the 
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Whether it is choosing to encourage or aid a robbery,179 the beating 
of a child,180 or a dangerous drag race,181 the accomplice, although 
not committing the actual crime, expresses his mental agreement 
with an act that violates accepted social norms and disrespects the 
value of the victim’s life. By expressing a reason for his conduct that 
undervalues the welfare of others, the accomplice signals that his 
views offend established social codes and warrant punishment.182 
Criminal liability for complicit behavior furthers the law’s retributive 
goals by holding accountable those whose deeds reflect an 
unacceptable lack of respect for the welfare of others, even if they do 
not commit the disrespectful action themselves.183 
Probably the best example in literature of a person deserving of 
moral condemnation, and hence criminal sanction, for contributing 
to a crime is Iago in Othello.184 Although Othello is the direct actor 
who murders his wife, Desdemona, Iago manipulates Othello and 
several others with misleading statements and planted evidence to 
orchestrate that result. Accomplice liability will only be found when 
there is unmistakable proof of tight overlap between the mental state 
of the accomplice and the ultimate criminal act. Iago clearly satisfies 
this standard.185 He advises Othello on exactly how to kill 
Desdemona.186 In his soliloquies to the audience, he makes clear that 
his behavior is completely voluntary. In fact, what is so chilling about 
Iago is that there are no outside forces propelling his efforts to ruin 
Othello and kill Desdemona.187 He is consumed with malice, but for 
no discernable reason. The malice is entirely of his own making. He 
 
level of culpability involved in the crime, and culpability is tied to the criminal’s mental state”); 
Aimee D. Borromeo, Comment, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, 3 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L. 175, 186–88 (2002) (discussing mental state required for retributive punishment). 
 179. State v. Sam, 907 A.2d 99, 113–15 (Conn. App. 2006). 
 180. State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786–87 (N.C. 1982). 
 181. State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 614–17 (Iowa 1982). 
 182. Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 
1034–35 (2008). 
 183. See KUTZ, supra note 92, at 139 (“Responses are warranted to what we do and who 
we are, not because of some deep metaphysics of causal responsibility, but because of what our 
actions and gestures of repair indicate about the view we take of our relations with others.”). 
 184. See People v. McCoy, 24 P.3d 1210, 1216–17 (Cal. 2001) (using the example of 
the Iago character to illustrate principles of accomplice liability for homicide). 
 185. Kadish, supra note 12, at 365 (“Iago’s actions leave no doubt what his game is.”). 
 186. Iago tells Othello: “Do it not with poison, strangle her in her bed.” WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. 
 187. See EDWARD PECHTER, OTHELLO AND INTERPRETIVE TRADITIONS 62 (1999). 
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holds himself above society’s norms and acts strictly out of self 
interest.188 This is made most clear at the end of the play when he 
not only brings about Desdemona’s murder at Othello’s hand, but 
kills his wife, Emilia, and his patron, Roderigo, without remorse.189 
Thus, Iago shows that he is completely indifferent to human 
welfare.190 This is what makes him deserving of retributive 
punishment.191 In assessing accomplice liability, criminal law looks to 
whether the accomplice’s behavior transgressed moral boundaries. 
Although perhaps not always as deserving of retribution as the evil 
Iago, culpable accomplices typically demonstrate disrespect for 
human life or dignity. A defendant that feeds ammunition to 
someone shooting into a crowd is an accomplice to reckless 
endangerment.192 A street drag racer exhibits sufficient disrespect for 
human life that he becomes an accomplice to the reckless vehicular 
assault committed by his drag racing opponent.193 When an actor 
embarks on a plan of action that potentially involves the use of 
deadly force by another, she “crosse[s] a moral divide” that subjects 
her, as an accomplice, to derivative liability for the deadly actions of 
others.194 
The immoral aspect of accomplice liability lies not in the act 
itself, but in the intentional choice to do a social wrong.195 There is 
no way to determine if someone has transgressed moral boundaries 
without conducting a vigorous examination of the defendant’s 
mindset. If our shared morality is largely based on the notion that 
individuals must display sufficient concern for the welfare of 
 
 188. FAITH NOSTBAKEN, UNDERSTANDING OTHELLO 193 (2000); MARVIN 
ROSENBERG, THE MASKS OF OTHELLO 174 (1992). 
 189. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 186, act 5, sc. 2. 
 190. See JANE ADAMSON, OTHELLO AS TRAGEDY: SOME PROBLEMS OF JUDGMENT AND 
FEELING 72 (1980). 
 191. Id. at 100. 
 192. State v. Garnica, 98 P.3d 207, 209 (Ariz. App. 2004). 
 193. People v. Hart, 778 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 194. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 195. Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 320 
(1996) (Culpability occurs when one “choose[s] to do a wrong in circumstances when that 
choice is freely made.”). Similarly, through prosecution for attempted but unsuccessful crimes, 
criminal law permits punishment based on a defendant’s possession of the required mental 
state even if the ultimate wrongful act remains uncompleted. See LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 
11.3. Punishment for attempt is not allowed, however, based on mental state alone. For 
conviction, the accused must have taken a “substantial step” towards completion of the crime. 
Id. § 11.4; see United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 106, 114–15 (2007). 
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others,196 no punishment is possible unless the defendant 
demonstrates insufficient concern for his fellow citizens.197 The nexus 
requirement evaluates the inner workings of the defendant’s mind, 
probing for expressions of agreement with the perpetrator’s criminal 
behavior that warrant retributive punishment.  
The requirement of significant overlap between the accomplice’s 
mental state and the underlying illegal act can leave many secondary 
parties exempt from legal regulation. The case of Iago is an easy one. 
We know from his monologues that he is an instigator, seeking the 
death of Desdemona and Othello’s ruin. Even though he does not 
murder Desdemona himself, we know that he desired and planned 
for that act to happen.198 The nexus between Iago’s mental state and 
the wrongful act of Desdemona’s murder is tight. In contrast to the 
reader’s ability to confidently judge and condemn Iago, however, the 
criminal justice system normally does not have access to lengthy 
confessional soliloquies to determine the exact mental state of an 
accomplice liability defendant.199 Without proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and to a “moral certainty” of a culpable mental state, there 
can be no accomplice liability.200 Given this high threshold for 
liability, accused accomplices may often avoid criminal liability in 
situations where it may seem reasonable to infer the defendant’s evil 
intent.201  
This high threshold is a calculated policy choice.202 In order to 
protect individual autonomy interests, accomplice liability doctrine 
demands a strictly-defined shared overlap of criminal intent between 
the accomplice and the perpetrator. In the criminal context, the law 
cannot tolerate false positives, i.e., convictions of innocent 
 
 196. See Matthew 7:12 (King James) (“Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even to them.”); Analects of Confucius 15:3 (“What you do not 
wish upon yourself, extend not to others.”); Last Sermon of Muhammad (“Hurt no one so that 
no one may hurt you.”). 
 197. See VICTOR TADROS, ACT, AGENCY, AND INDIFFERENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 83 (2005).  
 198. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 186, act. 5, sc. 2. 
 199. Cf. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 207 (discussing difficulties of determining intent in 
criminal cases). 
 200. Kelly v. State, 139 So. 2d 326, 329 (Ala. 1962).  
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 151–56. 
 202. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Justice 
Harlan noted that he “view[s] the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”). 
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defendants.203 Requiring specific intent to further the perpetrator’s 
crime makes sense given the restraint needed in the imposition of 
criminal sanctions. Criminal penalties are supposed to be a “last 
resort” because they subject defendants to social stigma not present 
in civil damage awards.204 A tight nexus serves retributive interests by 
limiting the imposition of state-sanctioned suffering to those 
secondary actors that truly intend for immoral activity to occur.205  
 
 203. Cf. David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1215 
(2006) (explaining that the reasonable doubt standard is employed for situations where the law 
seeks to minimize false positives). 
 204. Green, supra note 75, at 228, 230; see also KUTZ, supra note 92, at 208 (explaining 
that any criminal law system must be structured to avoid false positives because “nothing can 
repair the violence done to one’s sense of autonomy and worth by unjust punishment”); 
Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma out of Administrative Law: An 
Explanation of Consistent Beliefs, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2007) (explaining that 
the stigma of an adverse adjudication is greater in the criminal context, with its higher standard 
of proof, than in the administrative context). 
 205. Kadish, supra note 12, at 398 (indicating that the nexus requirement for accomplice 
liability is necessary to avoid an undesirable expansion of criminal liability). After retribution, 
the other prevailing justification for criminal punishment is deterrence. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, 
Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2005) 
(referring to retribution and deterrence as the two dominant contemporary criminal law 
theories). In contrast to retributivists, deterrence-based theorists are often uncomfortable with 
finding an explicit basis for criminal sanctions in normative judgments as to what is right and 
wrong. Binder, supra note 182, at 1000. Instead, they justify criminal penalties as a means to 
prevent conduct that is harmful to others. Moohr, supra note 160, at 749. The nexus 
requirement also serves deterrent interests in that it incarcerates those who completely 
sympathize with criminal behavior and thus may be likely to act criminally themselves in the 
future.  
Yet, even under a deterrence-based conception of criminal law, liability must be 
determined in some way based on social norms and shared moral values, not merely on the 
potential for harm. After all, some actions that result in harm to others are deemed socially 
beneficial. See State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997) (holding that a 
homeowner may use deadly force to prevent a burglar from taking her real or personal 
property); State v. Haley, 667 P.2d 560, 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the necessity 
defense absolves a defendant for illegal actions that were necessary to prevent a threat of bodily 
harm). Similarly, facilitating the infliction of bodily harm violates social norms in some 
situations, but not in others. A bystander may encourage a potential victim to defend herself 
with violent force yet not face criminal accomplice liability. See Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as 
Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317, 1329 (2006) (explaining self-defense 
according to utilitarian theory). A military subordinate who aids in a violent act may escape 
liability under a defense of obedience to superior orders. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). To decide which acts of assistance to those 
who commit violence should be exempted from liability, deterrence advocates must ask some 
of the same questions as retributivists. Without an “evil mind” that satisfies the mens rea 
requirement, there can be no accomplice liability because the defendant has not expressed a 
sentiment that clashes with established moral principles. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 1.2, at 8; see 
also Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 (explaining that “[d]esert is calculated by the level of 
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B. Difficulties in Applying the Nexus Requirement to Contributory 
Infringement 
For three reasons, it does not make sense to require the same 
tight nexus between the defendant’s mental state and the illegal 
activity of another in the infringement context. First, intellectual 
property disputes present evidentiary difficulties typically not found 
in criminal cases. In both contexts, intent may be determined 
through circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact may impute an 
intent to commit robbery based on the accomplice’s presence in the 
getaway car206 or intent to facilitate patent infringement based on the 
contributory defendant’s prior unsuccessful attempts to obtain a 
license from the patent holder.207 Making inferences from such 
evidence in the intellectual property context, however, is more 
difficult and less appropriate. Transactions between contributors and 
direct infringers are often conducted over a distance and through 
multiple intermediaries.208 As the connection between the 
contributor and direct infringer becomes more tenuous, it becomes 
more difficult to ascertain the contributor’s attitude towards the 
direct infringer’s conduct. The availability of ambiguous defenses to 
infringement, such as fair use, can further cloud attempts to discern 
the intent of the contributor.209 If it is unclear whether the direct 
infringer believed that her conduct was fair use, then it will be 
doubly unclear whether the once-removed contributor believed that 
as well. 
This assessment of mental state is further complicated because 
contributory infringement defendants are typically businesses while 
accomplice liability defendants are usually individuals.210 Because 
 
culpability involved in the crime, and culpability is tied to the criminal’s mental state”). At 
bottom, deterrence theorists and retributivists agree that there must be some moral criterion 
for assessing culpability, and, for purposes of accomplice liability, this requires an examination 
of the defendant’s intent. 
 206. United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2008). But see Gains v. 
State, 417 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 207. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 208. See generally Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1605 (2004) (advocating for a copyright liability regime sufficient to govern the 
actions of entities with no relationship to the direct infringer). 
 209. See Adams, supra note 18, at 635. 
 210. See Geraldine Scott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based 
Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1345–46 (2007) (noting 
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determining the mental state of an organization involves the 
consideration of the thoughts and perceptions of several individuals 
at once with differing levels of responsibility, determining the specific 
intent of an organization is comparatively difficult.211 Businesses 
involved in the distribution or supply of intellectual property or 
components of intellectual property are usually involved in many 
transactions at once. By contrast, criminal accomplices typically 
cannot simultaneously conduct multiple criminal activities. As a 
result, it is easier to assume that the criminal accomplice intended the 
ultimate consequences of the perpetrator’s activity than to assume 
that a business conducting hundreds of simultaneous transactions 
specifically desired the outcome caused by one of its clients. Courts 
may also have difficulty in differentiating between benign business 
reasons for engaging in an activity and intentional efforts to 
infringe.212 
Second, even if the evidence in intellectual property disputes did 
lend itself to determinations of specific intent, a specific intent 
requirement would prevent courts from implementing solutions to 
rampant infringement problems. Requiring the same tight nexus 
between the contributor’s mental state and illegal activity found in 
criminal law would exempt from liability all contributors that acted 
with knowledge but without intent. After the Grokster decision, 
successful cases of inducement infringement may be few and far 
between as companies learn to avoid public statements that could be 
seized upon as evidence of a culpable mental state.213 Thus, 
 
trend towards greater prosecution of individuals and lesser prosecution of firms for corporate 
crime).  
 211. See David C. Fortney, Note, Thinking Outside the “Black Box”: Tailored Enforcement 
in Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1627 n.120 (2003) (“Naturally, in a 
small business it is much easier to prove the mens rea of business owners or managers because 
there are fewer employees and each is subject to greater supervision.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1470 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (interpreting a contractual provision indemnifying the direct infringer for its 
infringement as merely facilitating “the sale [of the direct infringer] at the greatest possible 
price” and not probative of the contributory defendant’s intent to induce infringement); see 
also Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 231 (2005) (noting that 
antitrust scholars have rejected a focus on evidence of intent because “‘bad behavior’ is 
sometimes just another name for competitive behavior, of the kind the legal system might want 
to encourage”). 
 213. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1413 n.228; see also 3 NIMMER, supra 
note 55, at 12-115 to 12-116 (offering “easy to satisfy” suggestions on how potential 
contributory infringers can minimize liability through cautious advertising practices and 
refraining from certain internal communications).  
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exemption of knowledgeable intermediaries from liability leaves 
direct infringers as the only plausible target for enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. But the sheer number of direct 
infringers, as in the case of individual users of music and video file-
sharing services, as well as the ability in the digital age to conduct 
infringing activities in remote jurisdictions with the benefit of 
anonymizing technologies, often makes the exclusive prosecution of 
direct infringers impractical.214  
Courts evaluating contributory infringement cases have already 
diagnosed this problem, recognizing a need for a legal mechanism 
that puts pressure on online intermediaries.215 They have realized 
that requiring too great of an overlap between mental state and 
action would immunize most contributory infringers, and limiting 
liability to direct infringers would jeopardize creative incentives. If 
accomplice liability standards had been applied in the Amazon.com 
and Visa cases, both businesses would likely have been exempt from 
liability. The millions of transactions conducted by search engines 
and credit card companies every day would make it difficult to 
impute an intent to infringe from their behavior.216 A choice to 
implement accomplice liability’s nexus requirement would be a 
choice to allow rampant infringement to continue unchecked. 
Third, intellectual property law’s non-retributive theoretical 
underpinnings make requirement of a tight nexus between the 
mindset of the contributory defendant and the actions of the direct 
infringer unnecessary. The nexus requirement for accomplice liability 
stems from criminal law’s retributive basis. If citizens are to be made 
to suffer for their conduct, that conduct must be considered 
immoral217 and the trier of fact must be certain of the citizen’s 
 
 214. See Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion: 
Supplemental Measures the Recording Industry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2000); June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
Act and Its Failure to Address the Issue of Digital Music’s New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1361, 1385 (1997); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 1, at 1427 (recognizing that 
anonymity and infringement from locations outside of the United States will hamper efforts by 
copyright holders to prevent illegal file sharing, but believing that enforcement efforts can still 
have some success).  
 215. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912, 929–30 (2005); In re 
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 543, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2003); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 
576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 501–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 216. See Consolidated Answering Brief of All Defendants-Appellees, Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n., No. 05-15170, at 34–36 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 217. Moohr, supra note 160, at 774. 
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improper motives.218 For most crimes, the immoral nature of the 
accomplice’s conduct lies in her conscious decision to make someone 
commit an act that she knows is wrongful. Accomplice liability’s 
nexus requirement limits the last resort of criminal punishment to 
immoral conduct by only including defendants that intend for the 
perpetrator’s bad acts to occur. The rigorous nexus requirement 
permits some accomplices to escape liability, but this is deemed a 
worthwhile price to pay to avoid false positives.219 
By contrast, instead of being grounded on commonly shared 
moral values, intellectual property law’s guiding purpose is 
instrumental.220 Decisions as to liability and the scope of copyright 
and patent rights are often made based on a calculation of what will 
generate the greatest number of expressive or inventive works in 
society.221 Trademark law is not calibrated necessarily to generate 
more trademarks, but it is designed to provide for an efficient 
marketplace that consumers can navigate as quickly and reliably as 
possible.222 Both of these rationales for intellectual property 
protection are in keeping with utilitarian theories in providing for 
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number.”223 Accordingly, 
contributory infringement doctrine focuses its attention on the 
consequences of the infringement, not on the personal 
 
 218. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra Part IV.A. 
 220. COHEN ET AL., supra note 75, at 7 (explaining that the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution embraced the utilitarian rationale for copyright protection); ROBERT P. MERGES 
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) 
(“Utilitarian theory, and the economic framework built upon it, has long provided the 
dominant paradigm for analyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property 
protection.”); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
623–24 (2004) (noting the prevailing view of trademark law as designed to reduce consumer 
search costs “is now nearly total,” although incomplete). Although moral precepts cannot help 
but be a part of any adjudication, courts and legal scholars are particularly uncomfortable with 
discussions of morality and just punishment in the context of intellectual property. E.g., Sari 
Louis Ferraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“Copyright and trademark law are not matters of strong moral principle.”), vacated and 
remanded, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007); cf. Combs, supra note 162, at 252–53 (maintaining 
that tort law has “a lesser emphasis on morality” than criminal law). 
 221. MERGES ET AL., supra note 220, at 11 (“The principal objective of much of 
intellectual property law is the promotion of new and improved works . . . .”). 
 222. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law, like tort law in general . . . can best 
be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). 
 223. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 4–5 & n.1 (Prometheus Books 2007) (1780). 
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blameworthiness of the defendant, by emphasizing the defendant’s 
material contribution. It is the impact of the contributory 
defendant’s actions on the direct infringer that matters most, not the 
degree to which the defendant is out of step with community moral 
norms. In addition, the typical remedy in any case of intellectual 
property infringement is an injunction preventing the defendant’s 
further use of the work in question.224 Because the limited nature of 
intellectual property relief does not inflict the same devastating costs 
on defendants as criminal sanctions, there is no need to limit legal 
responsibility to only those who specifically intend for the underlying 
illegal conduct to occur. 
In sum, contributory infringement doctrine does not profit from 
analogies to accomplice liability. Criminal law relies on social norms 
and widely held views of moral conduct to set the boundaries of 
punishable behavior. In terms of accomplice liability doctrine, this 
translates to an emphasis on the link between the defendant’s mental 
state and the ultimate criminal act and a corresponding lack of 
attention to the defendant’s actual contribution to the underlying 
criminal endeavor. Given the different evidence available in 
intellectual property cases, the practicalities involved in reining in 
massive simultaneous online infringement, and the contrasting 
theoretical justifications for criminal punishment and intellectual 
property protection, analogizing accomplice liability to contributory 
infringement makes little sense. If they are to be borrowed from 
another body of law, contributory infringement standards must 
come from a different area of legal doctrine than accomplice liability. 
 
 
 224. See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(suggesting that injunctions will remain the standard remedy in patent cases because of 
valuation concerns); Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next 
Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 568 n.105 (2008) (“In the 
intellectual property context, injunctive relief is generally the available and appropriate remedy, 
but the state of the law in this area remains controversial.”). The Lanham Act specifically states 
that remedies for trademark infringement must be non-punitive. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (“Such 
[damages] shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.”). Legal scholarship tends to agree 
that relief from infringement should be tailored to incentivizing creative output, not to 
proportionately calibrating punishment to the defendant’s bad acts. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, 
supra note 135, at 18 (maintaining that intellectual property damages awards should be 
enhanced in some circumstances by a multiplier to maintain the necessary incentives for 
copyright, patent, and trademark rights holders). 
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V. A THEORY OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT CAUSATION 
If intellectual property’s guiding rationale is utilitarian, then one 
might conclude that there simply needs to be an analysis of 
contributory infringement based on utilitarian principles. The 
problem, however, is that the consequentialist theory behind 
intellectual property protection offers little traction to those seeking 
workable content for the material contribution requirement. Many 
would argue that it is impossible to use theories as to the potential 
economic effects of different levels of intellectual property protection 
to calibrate the exact boundaries of infringement liability.225 For 
every intellectual property regime, there is a dispute as to the 
economic impact of increased intellectual property protection.226 
Utilitarian theory can only tell us so much about whether or not 
entities like Visa and Google should be held contributorily liable. 
Moreover, even if courts could apply economic theory to 
determine the optimal level of liability for contributory infringement, 
it is not clear that the law should be organized in this manner. 
Criticism of law and economics scholarship posits that the rationality 
of human behavior is variable.227 It stands to reason that rational 
compliance with the law decreases when the law fails to track human 
intuition. Thus, it is not helpful to simply urge potential 
contributory infringers to behave in a way that provides the greatest 
good for the greatest number. A successful theory of accountability 
for the actions of others needs to offer guidance to citizens so they 
can structure their behavior accordingly. A law’s motivational force 
 
 225. CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 8–9 (2008); George L. 
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 
8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19, 
21–23 (John Palmer ed., 1986); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: 
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 
1573–76 (1993). 
 226. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:12, at 2-30.1 to 2-30.2 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that there is no consensus 
among economists as to whether trademarks and advertising create barriers to market entry); 
FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL 165 (1984) 
(opining that it may be impossible to identify the total costs and benefits of the patent system); 
Salil K. Mehra, Software as Crime: Japan, the United States, and Contributory Copyright 
Infringement, 79 TUL. L. REV. 265, 301–02 (2004) (discussing difficulties of calibrating a 
system of copyright enforcement).  
 227. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004). 
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will be insufficient unless its basis is obvious to those affected.228 
People do not see themselves as agents who are supposed to go forth 
and maximize group well-being.229 Instead, we need to look for 
another method for determining responsibility for the acts of 
another. 
One way of determining responsibility for contributory acts that 
is rarely employed in the accomplice liability context is causation. 
Modern accomplice liability eschews a study of causation in favor of 
an analysis of mental state.230 Relatively innocuous conduct that does 
little to facilitate the underlying criminal act satisfies the actus reus 
requirement for accomplice liability.231 The retribution rationale for 
criminal sanctions apportions punishment on the basis of the 
expressive content of one’s behavior, not causation.232 Yet despite its 
lack of significance in accomplice liability, causation is an important 
rubric that guides other bodies of law and our own innate sense of 
accountability. As discussed earlier, a viable system of accountability 
must be understandable to others if it is to guide behavior. We 
intuitively believe that even in the absence of fault, individuals bear 
some responsibility for the consequences of their actions.233 
Christopher Kutz has noted that in evaluating social responsibility 
for an action, we often apply what he calls the Individual Difference 
Principle.234 The Individual Difference Principle holds that an 
individual is accountable for a harm if she did something that “made 
a difference to its occurrence.”235 If the individual’s actions had no 
impact on the realization of the harm, then the individual is not 
 
 228. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 129. 
 229. Id. at 55. 
 230. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 325 (stating that ordinary causal limitations 
are disregarded in situations where a defendant is criminally liable for harm not caused by his 
own conduct but by the conduct of another); Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 (“[S]ince the 
concept of culpability provides the basis for our criminal justice system, the act requirement is 
secondary to the mental element.”). 
 231. See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
 232. FLETCHER, supra note 124, at 680 (“[T]hat one can contribute to a result without 
causing it lies at the foundation of accessorial liability.”).  
 233. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at xxxv (“That we are responsible for the harm 
we cause is a principle that makes an immediate appeal to common moral sensibility.”); Larry 
Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
375, 386 n.32 (2008) (stating that holding actors accountable for harms they nonculpably 
created “seems intuitively correct”).  
 234. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 3. 
 235. Id. 
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accountable.236  
We can see this principle at work when we think about how our 
own sense of responsibility is triggered by everyday events. Consider 
a scenario where I agree to house sit for someone and, being 
unfamiliar with their house, I accidentally bump into a vase, 
knocking it to the floor. The breaking of the vase is not my fault. I 
was acting with reasonable care when proceeding through the house 
and definitely had no intention or even knowledge that I was going 
to break the vase. Nevertheless, I will feel a sense of responsibility to 
the home owner for breaking her vase. I would definitely want to 
apologize for my action, and may want to pay for a replacement. The 
reason for this sense of responsibility on my part is causation. 
Because I caused the vase to break, even if it was not my fault, I bear 
some responsibility. 
Like “material contribution,” causation is a term susceptible to 
many meanings. It is impossible to define causation with perfect 
precision given the multiplicity of potential interactions between a 
secondary party and a direct infringer. Moreover, to some degree, 
causation is a policy question because defining causation determines 
how far the reach of the law should extend.237 Hence, a full account 
of causal theory and how it can be applied in all contributory 
infringement scenarios is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, some discussion of causation and how it might be used 
to determine liability may prove useful. Causation is a legal principle 
applied in many other areas of the law. Given its prevalence, judges 
and juries should be comfortable using it to determine liability.238 
What follow are some preliminary thoughts on the boundaries of 
contributory infringement as suggested by causal theory. 
 
 236. See id.; see also Kadish, supra note 12, at 332 (“In common usage, as well as in the 
law, whether we may be blamed for something that results from our actions turns on whether 
we may be said to have been the cause of that result . . . .”). 
 237. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 320. But see Moore, supra note 14, at 407 
(disagreeing with theorists who “claim a freedom for the law to define its notion of cause-in-
fact as it pleases, to serve its own purposes”). 
 238. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 307; see also David W. Robertson, The 
Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1997) (describing the “but for” 
causation test as “both simple enough for everyday application in lawyers’ offices and busy trial 
courts and at the same time comprehensive enough to solve the recurrent types of occasionally 
quite challenging causation difficulties”). 
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A. Liability for Causal Contributors 
We intuitively assess causal responsibility for the actions of 
another in various ways. As described below, we typically believe 
there is a causal relationship when the act at issue would not have 
occurred but for the action of the party responsible. Causation is 
found even when another party would have likely stepped in to 
perform the same facilitating act if the defendant had refused. 
Causation is more likely to be inferred on the basis of affirmative 
activity rather than passive inactivity. This presumption against 
causation for passive behavior can be overcome, however, when the 
behavior at issue represents a departure from ordinary circumstances. 
 
1. “But for” causation 
To the extent a causation requirement exists for accomplice 
liability, it simply requires that the accomplice do something that 
makes the ultimate criminal act infinitesimally more probable or 
easier to accomplish. For example, in one famous case often used to 
illustrate accomplice liability, the defendant sent a telegram urging 
the telegraph office not to deliver a previous telegram by another 
that was meant to warn the victim that he was being pursued by four 
killers.239 It was by no means clear that receipt of the warning 
telegram would have saved the victim’s life. Nevertheless, the 
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s actions 
were sufficient for accomplice liability: 
The assistance given . . . need not contribute to the criminal result 
in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued. It is 
quite sufficient if it facilitated a result that would have transpired 
without it. . It is quite enough if the aid merely rendered it easier 
for the principal actor to accomplish the end intended by him and 
the aider and abettor, though in all human probability the end 
would have been attained without it. . . . [H]e who facilitates 
murder even by so much as destroying a single chance of life the 
assailed might otherwise have had, he thereby supplements the 
efforts of the perpetrator, and he is guilty . . . notwithstanding it 
may be found that in all human probability the chance would not 
 
 239. State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722 (Ala. 1894). 
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have been availed of, and death would have resulted anyway.240 
In other words, even if the criminal act most likely would have 
occurred with or without the action of the accomplice, the actus reus 
requirement is still satisfied. In fact, even if it can be shown that the 
accomplice’s aid had no impact on the ultimate criminal action, an 
accomplice with sufficient mens rea may still be liable.241  
Such a relaxed causation standard, to the extent it can be called a 
causation standard, would be inappropriate for contributory 
infringement. Criminal law ensures that its sanctions are reserved 
only for those accomplices that specifically intend to aid the 
defendant’s conduct. Because a strict intent standard is the focus of 
accomplice liability, the contribution standard for accomplice liability 
can be broad in scope without offending our sense of proportionality 
or just desert. When it has been demonstrated beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intended the crime to occur and acted to 
facilitate it, it seems appropriate to impose criminal liability, even if 
the crime would have occurred without the defendant’s action. But 
intellectual property law, for the reasons mentioned above, cannot 
target liability solely on the basis of intent.242 The knowing 
facilitation of infringement doctrine requires only a finding of actual 
or constructive knowledge.243 This places increased pressure on the 
material contribution requirement, making a causation standard as 
broad as the standard for accomplice liability unworkable. 
Instead, the causation standard for contributory infringement 
should be construed more narrowly but still in a manner that 
matches human intuition. The material contribution standard should 
be satisfied when the act of infringement would not have occurred 
but for the aid of the defendant.244 We instinctively assign 
responsibility to actors when the result at issue would not have 
occurred in the absence of the actor’s conduct.245 Under this theory 
of causation, soliciting or instigating infringement would normally 
 
 240. Id. at 738–39. 
 241. Dressler, supra note 118, at 102–03. 
 242. See supra Part IV.B. 
 243. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 244. Cf. Dressler, supra note 118, at 125. 
 245. See P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 121 (3d ed. 1980) 
(“There is no doubt that in most cases the ‘but for’ test is intuitively and intelligently used to 
decide the issue of cause in fact.”). 
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be a material contribution.246 Another way to satisfy the causation 
standard would be to provide for the direct infringer an unusual 
service, i.e., one that is difficult to find or specially tailored to the 
defendant’s needs while other customers receive standardized 
services. Without the contributor’s provision of a unique service, the 
infringement would not have occurred. As a result, the contributor 
satisfies the requirement of “but for” causation.247 
2. Causation and hypothetical alternatives 
Our theory of causation also needs to identify what does and 
does not break established causal chains. For any event, there are an 
infinite number of actions and conditions that may be deemed 
necessary for that event to have taken place.248 But to comport with 
our intuitive sense of just accountability, some actions that are 
essential to the end result need to be exempted from liability. For 
example, in tort law, the voluntary intervention of a second human 
agent usually absolves the first human agent from responsibility.249 If 
A throws a lighted cigarette into dry brush that catches fire, she is 
the cause of the fire. But if, just as the flames are about to die out, B 
knowingly pours gasoline on those flames, then B becomes the cause 
of that fire, not A, even though A’s initial act was essential to the 
creation of the fire.250  
Contributory infringement cases often involve suppliers and 
distributors of goods. Often a business will assist a direct infringer, 
but one might argue that the infringement still would have taken 
place even without the business’s involvement because the direct 
infringer could have hired another business to assist him if the first 
business refused. For example, a business might provide sheets of 
iron to the infringer, who shapes those sheets into an apparatus that 
 
 246. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1169, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(sales representative held contributorily liable for trademark infringement when he claimed to 
“even the score” with a rival business by contacting manufacturers and asking them to produce 
lamps identical to those produced by plaintiff). 
 247. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 159 (explaining that the law and common 
intuition typically distinguishes between the causal nature of routine and independent exercises 
of discretion). 
 248. See generally Robert C. Hilborn, Sea Gulls, Butterflies, and Grasshoppers: A Brief 
History of the Butterfly Effect in Nonlinear Dynamics, 72 AM. J. PHYSICS 425, 425–26 (2004). 
 249. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 73–75. 
 250. Id. at 74. 
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infringes someone else’s patent.251 Without the supply of the iron 
sheets, the infringing apparatus could not have been assembled so 
the infringement would not have occurred but for the first business’s 
conduct. It would seem that the causation requirement has been 
satisfied. Yet even though the direct infringer chose this particular 
business for its iron needs, it surely could have purchased the iron 
from another entity as well. Borrowing a term used by Joshua 
Dressler, I will refer to such alternative entities as “hypothetical 
alternative causes.”252 In one sense, the first business causes the 
infringement by providing a material needed for the ultimate act of 
infringement. But in another sense, it does not satisfy a “but for” 
causation standard because a host of other businesses would have 
willingly stepped in to provide the same service. In the Visa case, the 
majority and Judge Kozinski battled over this notion of hypothetical 
alternative cause. Kozinski rejected it, arguing that because 
“infringement can always be carried out by other means,” the 
existence of alternative sources of aid should not prevent satisfaction 
of the material contribution standard.253 The majority, however, 
suggested that the existence of other viable funding mechanisms 
demonstrated that Visa’s provision of payment services was not 
material.254 
A viable causation theory for intellectual property protection 
requires that the existence of hypothetical alternative causes not be 
allowed to break otherwise sufficient causative chains.255 A contrary 
rule would contradict established precedent. Just as there are other 
ways than Visa to submit payments online, there are other search 
engines than Google. Under the Visa majority’s rationale, the 
Google search engine could not materially contribute to 
infringement by touting infringing websites because consumers 
could choose to locate the infringing websites through other search 
engines. Yet the Ninth Circuit found that Google could be 
contributorily liable while exempting Visa. For consistency, a 
 
 251. See Millner v. Schofield, 17 F. Cas. 392, 392–93 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1881) (No. 9609A). 
 252. Dressler, supra note 118, at 131. 
 253. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 814 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 254. Id. at 797–98. 
 255. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 249 (“In the case of a hypothetical 
alternative cause, the generally accepted view is that defendant’s wrongful or criminal act has 
caused the harm, for which the wrongdoer is therefore criminally or civilly responsible, despite 
the existence of a set of alternative conditions sufficient to produce the same harm.”). 
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hypothetical alternative supplier of online payment services should 
not break the causal chain. 
More importantly, a theory of causation that recognizes that an 
actor can cause infringement by another even if hypothetical 
alternative causers were available to perform the same actions 
matches our own intuitive view of when facilitation of a wrong 
should result in responsibility. For example, if a friend lets me 
borrow his car and, due to years of wear and tear, the car breaks 
down during my drive, I feel some responsibility for returning a 
nonworking car to my friend. I would apologize to my friend even 
though the breaking down of the car was not my fault, and I drove 
the car in a normal manner. In a sense, the breaking down of the car 
during the time period when I borrowed it is mere chance. If my 
friend had lent the car to one other person immediately before me, 
that person would have brought back a nonfunctional car, not me. 
Nevertheless, because I was the one whose willful physical action 
resulted in the car breaking down, I accept some responsibility. 
Under the Visa majority’s reasoning, a business that provides a 
service to the direct infringer can always avoid liability if another 
business exists to take its place. Our own intuition suggests, 
however, that the actor that contributed to an event bears 
responsibility even if another hypothetical actor could have just as 
easily substituted in that actor’s stead.256 
3. Failures to act and abnormal environmental causes 
Our causation theory also needs to address passive contributions 
to infringement. Sometimes the contributor’s causing of the 
infringement will be obvious, as in the case of a business that 
supplies a component that can only be used in a device that infringes 
another’s patent. But for that component, the direct infringer could 
 
 256. In some situations, we may intuitively believe that the supplier’s contribution is too 
minimal to justify the imposition of contributory liability even if the supplier’s contribution is 
“necessary” for the infringing activity to occur. For example, the Visa majority fretted that an 
overly broad reading of the Napster definition of “material contribution” would make liable 
not only credit card companies but even utilities that provide the electricity necessary for 
operation of infringing websites. Visa, 494 F.2d at 800. While it may be necessary to screen 
out certain de minimis activities from the material contribution requirement, the existing 
doctrine should obviate some of the majority’s concerns as it requires knowledge of 
infringement for liability and exempts contributory defendants that distribute staple articles of 
commerce without the intent to cause infringement. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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never have assembled the materials that allowed him to infringe.257 
In other situations, however, the defendant does not take any 
affirmative physical action that immediately aids the direct infringer. 
A landlord may provide the site and facilities where the trademark 
infringement occurs but does nothing else to facilitate the sale of 
counterfeit goods.258 A radio station may unknowingly permit a 
purchaser of air time to play copyrighted music but offer no other 
assistance to the purchaser’s infringement and still be held liable.259 
The causation principles for contributory infringement should take 
into account situations where the contributor undertakes no specific 
willful act that facilitates the infringement but by failing to act may 
still be responsible for creating the environment where the 
infringement can occur.  
Accountability for certain failures to act comports with intuitive 
notions of responsibility. Even when our affirmative willful behavior 
is not directly involved, we often feel responsible when an injury 
occurs in our presence that we could have prevented. Failure to act, 
under the right circumstances, is commonly viewed in causal 
terms.260 If someone drowns in my swimming pool, I feel 
accountable. Even if the victim was not an invited guest and entered 
my pool without my knowledge, I may still feel a sense of 
responsibility for not preventing her death. 
Historically, courts have been reluctant to find entities liable for 
inaction.261 Nevertheless, liability for nonfeasance is an essential part 
of the law.262 When the defendant’s behavior amounts to a failure to 
act, the trier of fact engages in an especially searching analysis of the 
circumstances of the plaintiff’s injury to determine if the defendant’s 
behavior falls under an exception to the general rule that defendants 
 
 257. See, e.g., Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
 258. See, e.g., Habeeba’s Dance of the Arts v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 711–12, 
714 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
 259. See Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 212, 214 (N.D. Ohio 1981). 
 260. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 2–3. 
 261. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 200–02 (1989) 
(distinguishing between “the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom,” 
which triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause, and the State’s failure to act to 
protect the individual’s liberty interests, which does not). 
 262. See Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Law, 82 
IND. L.J. 411, 418–20 (2008) (describing the gradual retreat from misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction in American law). 
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are not liable in tort for a failure to act for the plaintiff’s benefit.263  
To assess whether the responsibility I feel for my failure to 
prevent the drowning in my pool should give rise to legal 
accountability, the circumstances surrounding the victim’s death 
must be scrutinized to look for the presence of anything unusual. In 
ferreting out the cause of illegal actions, courts assess whether the 
behavior at issue should be considered a “cause” or a “condition.”264 
A condition is a typically present environmental factor that leads to a 
result.265 The presence of oxygen is necessary for a house to catch on 
fire, yet we would not describe the presence of oxygen as a cause of 
the fire. Instead, the presence of oxygen is a condition. By contrast, a 
cause is something that provides an explanation as to why a result 
occurred. A child playing with matches would be deemed a cause of 
the fire, not a condition. A parent’s failure to supervise the child 
while that child was in the proximity of matches might be deemed a 
cause as well. In determining why the victim drowned in my pool, 
bystanders would ask whether there was anything unusual about my 
home or pool that attracted the victim. Did I somehow advertise the 
presence of the pool to the neighborhood? Did I maintain my pool 
in an inherently unsafe manner? Was the placement of my pool 
unusually accessible to trespassers? Did I typically observe and 
prevent outsiders from entering my pool area and fail to do that on 
this occasion? The point of such questions is to determine whether 
some behavior of mine can be labeled as an abnormal factor in the 
victim’s death, and thus a cause and not a condition. When a 
contributory infringer behaves in a non-routine fashion, this is 
important circumstantial evidence of causation.266 
The difference between cause and condition is a useful way to 
explain the disparate contributory infringement holdings in the Visa 
and Amazon.com cases. First, Perfect 10’s claim against Visa focused 
on Visa’s failure to prevent infringing behavior. As mentioned above, 
courts are less likely to find liability for a failure to act as compared to 
evidence of affirmative misconduct. Given Visa’s attenuated 
relationship to the directly infringing websites, it would have been 
 
 263. See DAN C. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 853–55 (2000). 
 264. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 35. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Cf. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (finding domain name registrar not liable for contributory trademark infringement 
after noting the routine nature of the registrar’s routing services). 
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particularly difficult for Perfect 10 to argue that Visa’s behavior 
constituted affirmative aid to the infringers. Businesses looking to 
accept online credit card payments do not arrange for acceptance of 
such payments with Visa directly. Instead, they contact what Visa 
labels “acquirers,” i.e., merchant banks. Visa remains in the 
background, leaving it to the merchant banks to process the actual 
transactions.267 Because Visa does not engage in any significant 
activity with businesses that transact with the merchant banks that 
are part of its network, its role in the infringement could only be 
construed as a failure to act.268  
Second, Visa’s failure to act represented a typical condition of the 
commercial environment. The payment processing services at issue in 
Visa were entirely routine. Visa does not tailor its services for each 
individual business.269 In non-infringement contexts, credit card 
companies have been found contributorily liable, but only because 
they altered their typical services in a way that facilitated the conduct 
of the direct tortfeasor.270 But in its involvement with the websites 
that infringed on Perfect 10’s rights, Visa did nothing to depart from 
standard operating procedure. Judge Kozinski maintained in his 
dissent that Visa’s contribution to the infringing websites was 
material because the ability to accept credit card payments is crucial 
to internet commerce.271 While that may be true, the real question a 
court should be asking is whether Visa behaved unusually with 
regard to the infringing transaction. From the facts at hand, it 
appears that Visa helped arrange the processing of payments that 
allowed the infringement to take place, but Visa was in no sense 
 
 267. See Accept Visa Online, http://usa.Visa.com/merchants/new_acceptance/accept_ 
online.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (directing businesses to contact an acquirer to set up 
online payments with Visa).  
 268. One way for a court to determine whether the defendant’s action is a cause or a 
condition is to ascertain whether the contributor was present at the moment of illegal conduct. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979). Not only does presence offer 
circumstantial evidence that may allow a court to infer knowledge, but it also may allow a court 
to conclude that the contributor’s behavior was out of the ordinary. Of course, mere presence, 
by itself, is not enough to demonstrate causation, but it may serve as an important sign that the 
defendant’s behavior was causal.  
269 See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 137 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(affirming district court finding that Visa does not engage in merchant-specific pricing). 
 270. See, e.g., Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 271. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n., 494 F.3d 788, 810–14 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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actively facilitating infringement or engaging in any behavior 
different from its standard business practices for accepting credit card 
transactions. Because Visa’s behavior was neither active nor out of 
the ordinary, it can be described as a condition of infringement but 
not its cause. 
By contrast, Google’s conduct may be described as active and 
abnormal, a cause rather than a condition. Google’s actions were 
qualitatively more affirmative and intimately involved with the 
infringers and their infringing content than Visa’s actions. To catalog 
the infringing websites’ content, Google scanned the infringing 
websites and then stored images of the infringing websites on its 
servers.272 In addition, Google framed the infringing content 
alongside its own content. When a consumer viewed a thumbnail 
image from the infringing website in Google’s search listings and 
clicked on that image, the consumer’s computer screen was filled 
with both the Google search listings page and the content from the 
infringing websites.273 As Google’s contact with the infringing 
content became more intimate, its conduct appeared less like a 
failure to act and more like active facilitation. We are naturally more 
willing to attribute causal responsibility to affirmative conduct than 
to passive behavior.274 Although it did not indicate that it was 
applying causative principles, the affirmative character of Google’s 
behavior may have convinced the court to find in favor of Perfect 
10.275  
Google’s conduct may also be seen as more out of the ordinary 
than Visa’s. On the one hand, there is no indication that Google 
treated images from infringing websites differently than images from 
noninfringing websites. On the other hand, Google employed a 
radically new technology to scan, store, and provide copyrighted 
images for mass consumption. In evaluating Google’s direct liability 
under the fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit even described its 
actions as “highly transformative.”276 Thus, while Visa’s processing of 
payments from merchants represented an activity that had been 
taking place for years, Google’s new search technology represented a 
 
 272. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832–33 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 273. Id. 
 274. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 174, at 64. 
 275. Visa, 494 F.3d at 801–02 (distinguishing the Google case as involving allegation of 
“specific acts” designed to encourage infringement). 
 276. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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dramatic break from the status quo. 
One danger in applying traditional causative principles to these 
disputes is that courts might focus too much on whether the 
contributory defendant’s conduct was abnormal, penalizing those 
businesses that invest in innovative technologies. One other causative 
principle should help protect technologists from liability, however. 
Liability for failure to act should only satisfy the material 
contribution standard when the defendant also has the ability to 
correct the infringing activity. If the contributor is present but has 
no ability to stop the infringing behavior, then there is no causation. 
A defendant can hardly be deemed to have caused an event through 
a failure to act if it could not have prevented the event in the first 
place.277 Again, this comports with our intuitive sense of causation 
and responsibility. When someone comes to my house and drowns in 
my swimming pool, I feel some responsibility, even if I took all 
reasonable precautions beforehand, because there was probably some 
way for me to stop the victim from drowning. On the other hand, if 
a plane crashes into my house, I do not feel responsibility for the 
deaths of the passengers. The difference is that there was nothing 
within my power to prevent the plane crash, but conceivably simple 
actions could have prevented the drowning in my pool. If Google’s 
contributory liability makes sense, it makes sense because it had the 
ability to stop the infringing conduct but failed to do so.278 
Looking for unusual or abnormal behavior in cases involving an 
alleged contributor’s failure to act is a better indicator of causation 
than “control,” which, as discussed earlier, is often cited by the 
courts in determining material contribution.279 Use of the term 
“control” threatens to import vicarious liability standards into an 
evaluation of contributory liability. When the relationship between 
the direct infringer and the defendant is one that gives the defendant 
the right and ability to supervise the conduct of the direct infringer, 
imposition of vicarious liability is permitted.280 Evaluation of the 
 
 277. See, e.g., Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1976). 
 278. Although the Ninth Circuit remanded for further consideration of Google’s ability 
to refrain from providing access to the infringing websites, the court seemed to suggest that 
Google did have such an ability as it analogized Google’s situation to the Napster file sharing 
system and the operator of an electronic bulletin board, both of which had been found to have 
the capability of preventing the infringing activity and were held contributorily liable. Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 279. See supra footnotes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 280. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
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right and ability to supervise is dangerously similar, however, to 
evaluation of the contributor’s control over the direct infringer. 
Vicarious and contributory responsibility are two markedly different 
theories of secondary liability, and their standards should not be 
mixed.281 Vicarious liability imposes liability on a defendant in the 
absence of any knowledge, action, or contribution to the 
infringement whatsoever. Instead, the doctrine simply allocates the 
costs of infringement to an intermediary based on that intermediary’s 
relationship to the direct infringer.282 Contributory infringement law, 
by contrast, is designed to address those situations where liability can 
only be justified on the basis of blameworthiness, and not mere 
agency. And one way of assessing personal blame is to assess whether 
the defendant caused the illegal act.283 
B. Inducement: Liability Without Causation 
An objection might be made that a causation standard for 
contributory liability’s material contribution requirement would 
exempt some parties that we intuitively believe should be liable. One 
can envision a scenario where the defendant tries to encourage the 
direct infringer’s illegal activity, but the direct infringer misses the 
defendant’s cues or already has its mind made up and does not need 
any additional egging on to commit the act of infringement. The 
defendant might argue in such a situation that its relationship to the 
ultimate act of infringement is in no way causal, and, therefore, it has 
not made a material contribution. If infringement law’s theoretical 
basis is exclusively consequentialist, then the defendant should bear 
no responsibility for conduct that has no effect on the underlying act 
of infringement. 
If only the knowing facilitation analysis of contributory 
infringement were available, the defendant would be correct. But in 
 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 281. See Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the court’s “duty to discern” the difference between contributory, vicarious, and 
direct infringement). 
 282. See, e.g., Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 
685–86 (D. Md. 2001) (explaining the necessity of an agency relationship to find vicarious 
liability). 
 283. GLENYS WILLIAMS, INTENTION AND CAUSATION IN MEDICAL NON-KILLING: THE 
IMPACT OF CRIMINAL LAW CONCEPTS ON EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 7 (2007) 
(describing causation as a crucial “governing factor in establishing blameworthiness and 
liability”). 
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this limited situation, infringement law can take on a retributive 
flavor, and lessons learned from accomplice liability prove helpful. In 
the scenario outlined above, the nexus between the mental state of 
the defendant and the act of direct infringement is tight. The 
defendant specifically intends the infringement. In criminal law, 
when the accomplice specifically intends for the perpetrator’s act to 
occur, proof of causation from the accomplice’s activity is 
unnecessary. As with the case of the telegram sender in Alabama, for 
accomplice liability the key issue is whether the accomplice 
unmistakably endorsed the perpetrator’s criminal behavior, not 
whether the accomplice’s behavior actually caused the criminal act.284 
Like accomplice liability, the inducement infringement doctrine 
punishes actors based largely on the expressive content of their 
actions. It represents a temporary departure from the utilitarian 
calculations of most intellectual property law. The Supreme Court 
has held that no safe harbor exists for a contributory defendant who 
supplies a device capable of substantial noninfringing uses but who 
also specifically intends for infringement to occur.285 Thus, a finding 
of intent to induce infringement forces a court to ignore the 
consequences of restricting the behavior of an intellectual property 
intermediary.  
The justification for such a causation-free system of liability lies 
in the same retribution principles that animate criminal 
jurisprudence. Criminal law examines two criteria in determining 
whether the accused’s behavior warrants punishment. First, there is 
the subjective question of whether the accused expected harm as a 
result of her actions. For the most part, actions that are taken 
unintentionally or involuntarily are not subject to criminal 
sanction.286 The reason for this is that it would be unfair to impose 
suffering on someone who only acted involuntarily. It would strike 
too severe of a blow against personal freedom if the state could 
punish citizens’ actions that were not made of their own free will.287 
 
 284. See supra Part IV.A. 
 285. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–37 (2005). 
 286. See Binder, supra note 182, at 1049 (“Traditionally, harm has been seen as most 
culpable when caused on purpose.”); Hall, supra note 9, at 777 (stating that the rule that 
“moral culpability is posited on volitional conduct” is a “fundamental axiom of ethics”). 
 287. See KUTZ, supra note 92, at 204 (“Unless citizens can reasonably predict and 
control the imposition of legal sanctions, they cannot lead good and meaningful lives within 
the law’s constraints.”). 
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Second, the law investigates the reason behind the defendant’s 
decision to act despite an awareness that his behavior would result in 
harm. Some reasons for acting in a harmful manner are adequate and 
absolve the defendant from liability. For example, a motivation of 
self-defense justifies a defendant’s acting with the intent to cause 
harm. But when the defendant elects to cause harm in a manner that 
flaunts deep-seated, widely accepted social beliefs, criminal sanctions 
are justified.288 Criminal law doctrine condemns the murderer who 
kills for financial gain and the rapist who violates another for 
personal pleasure.289 It is the expression of values that unmistakably 
clash with honored, accepted social values that subjects one to a 
criminal sanction, even for crimes that were only attempted but not 
consummated, or for actions that merely aided the criminal activity 
of another.290 
Although it would be cruel and unusual to subject the 
contributory infringer to the same sanctions as the murderer or the 
rapist, the same justifications animate liability for the inducing variety 
of contributory infringement. As articulated by the Supreme Court 
in its Grokster opinion, the inducement analysis does not rely on the 
consequences of infringing behavior.291 Instead, as with criminal 
accomplice liability, liability for inducement infringement punishes 
people for their outward expressions of commitment to unworthy 
values. In evaluating whether a defendant is liable for the 
inducement variety of contributory infringement, a court should 
evaluate whether the two criteria for criminal punishment have been 
satisfied. 
Take the most common example in the case law on inducing 
infringement: the manufacture or distribution of a device that allows 
others to infringe. Assume that the manufacturer knows that the 
device can be used to infringe but that the device also allows others 
 
 288. See Binder, supra note 182, at 1050 (“Whether costs are assigned to an activity 
depends on its moral worth.”). 
 289. See Moohr, supra note 160, at 749 (remarking that, under a theory of retributivism, 
criminal law punishes only “morally wrong conduct” and the moral code likely derives from 
community norms and ideals of right and wrong). 
 290. The imposition of liability under the felony murder rule operates on similar 
principles. The felony murder rule permits the imposition of criminal sanctions for murder on 
those who knowingly expect harm to result from their actions and facilitate that harm for 
socially unacceptable reasons. See Binder, supra note 182, at 967. 
 291. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005). 
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to make noninfringing use of intellectual property.292 Although the 
manufacturer knows that the device may be used by some in a 
completely lawful, nonharmful manner, it also knows that others can 
use the device to subvert the intellectual property interests of the 
rights holder. In this situation, the first criterion for the imposition 
of sanctions under criminal law, expectation of harm, is met. The 
manufacturer knows its device fosters infringement that will reduce 
the value of the property interest held by the rights holder. 
The second criterion for imposing criminal sanctions is that the 
defendant’s reason for acting in a manner that can cause harm is 
socially unacceptable. To satisfy this criterion, the defendant’s 
reasoning cannot be susceptible to multiple interpretations or fall 
into an ambiguous moral area. Instead, it must be unmistakable that 
the reasons for imposing harm on others clash with generally 
accepted ethical principles. The inducement doctrine tracks this 
criterion. For inducement infringement to be found, there must be a 
“clear expression” of the intent to facilitate infringement.293 In the 
Supreme Court’s view, the Grokster file sharing service was liable 
because “[t]he unlawful objective [was] unmistakable.”294 In other 
words, Grokster’s actions were not susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. Grokster satisfied the second criterion under criminal 
law because the reasons for its decision to act in a way that harmed 
the interests of copyright holders were indefensible. Grokster, by 
seeking to profit through infringing acts of others, expressed a 
reason for its conduct that was offensive to basic values of property 
ownership.  
On the other hand, when a defendant knowingly distributes a 
device capable of some infringement but justifies its behavior 
through a belief that downstream users of the device will be 
engaging in fair use, then the second criterion for criminal liability is 
not satisfied. For someone to be guilty of inducing infringement, 
they must know that the behavior they are intentionally encouraging 
is illegal. If the defendant is not choosing to engage in the harmful 
activity for a socially unacceptable reason, the justification for 
criminal liability drops away. Thus, to the extent that courts have left 
 
 292. See, e.g., Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (defendant manufactured software program that purchasers could use to replicate 
copyrighted typeface). 
 293. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919. 
 294. Id. at 940. 
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this question unresolved, a claim for inducement infringement 
should not be available when the contributory defendant subjectively 
believes in the legality of the direct infringer’s conduct.295  
As with accomplice liability, the standard for inducement 
infringement must be construed rigorously to avoid false positives. 
By trumping the safe harbor established for substantially non-
infringing devices, inducement theory represents a significant 
weapon in the hands of intellectual property rights holders. As a 
result, the plaintiff should be able to use the doctrine only when the 
contributory infringer’s specific intent to infringe is apparent and 
unmistakable. Simply knowing that infringement is likely is not 
enough. Given the ambiguous nature of the fair use defense in 
copyright and trademark law296 and the inherent difficulties in 
determining specific intent,297 liability for intentional inducement of 
infringement should be rare.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts seeking to plug the doctrinal holes of contributory 
infringement have resorted to analogies from criminal law. At first 
glance, criminal contributory liability principles seem like a natural 
fit. Like intellectual property law, criminal law holds some individuals 
accountable for the illegal acts of others based on their own actions 
and mental state. But accomplice liability is very different from the 
current incarnation of contributory infringement doctrine. Whereas a 
contributory infringer must “materially” contribute to the 
infringement, an accomplice’s actions need not make a difference to 
the performance of the ultimate criminal act. And while for most 
crimes it must be proved that the accomplice intended for the 
criminal activity to occur, a contributory infringement defendant 
may be liable even if she was indifferent to the direct infringer’s 
conduct.  
It would be a mistake to treat accused contributory infringers as 
a type of accomplice. Differences in proof and available evidence 
mandate a different contributory liability regime for intellectual 
 
 295. See supra Part II.B. 
 296. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. 
REV. 1095, 1165 (2003); Erez Reuveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 285, 312 (2007). 
 297. See supra Part IV.B. 
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property infringement. Causation offers an intuitive method for 
assessing the responsibility of one actor for the actions of another. 
Applying causative theory, the material contribution requirement for 
knowing facilitation of infringement would be satisfied when the 
infringement would not have occurred but for the accused 
contributor’s behavior. Certain failures to act should also result in 
contributory liability, but only when the failure to act represents a 
departure from background norms. On the other hand, criminal law 
does offer some guidance for courts struggling to define the 
boundaries of inducement infringement, where evidence of a 
culpable mental state is more important than the materiality of the 
contributor’s conduct. These suggested approaches to contributory 
infringement doctrine match common sense expectations of the 
responsibility we owe to others. Parties to contributory infringement 
suits deserve predictable and consistent rulings. They also deserve a 
body of doctrine that comports with social intuitions of fairness and 
blame. 
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